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A MEASURE OF OUR JUSTICE SYSTEM: A
LOOK AT MAINE'S INDIGENT CRIMINAL
DEFENSE DELIVERY SYSTEM
I. INTRODUCTION
In January 1995 the United States criminal justice system treated
court observers to a study in contrasts. In a Mineola, New York,
courthouse, Colin Ferguson, charged with the murder of six com-
muters and the attempted murder of nineteen others aboard the
Long Island Railroad, proceeded pro se, despite attempts by the
judge and his advisors to dissuade him.' Meanwhile, across the
country in Los Angeles, California, O.J. Simpson, charged with the
murders of his ex-wife and her friend, proceeded with so many at-
torneys that it was hard to keep track.2 At times, each case offered
scenes from the theater of the absurd. Ferguson said in his opening
statement that "[t]here were 93 counts to that indictment, 93 counts
only because it matches the year 1993. If it had been 1925, it would
have been a 25-count indictment.",3 In the Simpson trial, the de-
fense was unable to start its opening statement as scheduled because
the camera in the courtroom inadvertently caught a split second
glimpse of an alternate juror.' The judge was so enraged that he
recessed court for the day to consider how to handle the situation.
Perhaps more than anything else, the two cases illustrate the im-
portance of attorneys in the criminal justice process. On October
10, 1995, Simpson was found not guilty.6 He got the best defense
that money could buy. His attorneys fought the prosecutors every
inch of the way.' The guilty verdict in Ferguson's case was, how-
l. Rail-Massacre Suspect to Be Own Counsel, THE COMMERCIAL APPEAL, Dec.
10, 1994, at A2; John T. McQuiston, Defendant Helps Pick Jurors in Rail Deaths
Case, THE FRESNO BEE, Jan. 21, 1995, at A7.
2. Johnnie Cochran, Robert Shapiro, Alan Dershowitz, Barry Scheck, F. Lee Bai-
ley, Carl Douglas, and Robert Kardashian were among the full-time attorneys.
Others, including the Santa Clara University Law School dean, Gerald Uelman,
joined the team to argue specific issues. Howard Chua-Eoan & Elizabeth Gleick,
Making the Case, TIME, Oct. 16, 1995, at 48.
3. David Van Biema, A Fool for a Client, TIME, Feb. 6, 1995, at 66, 66.
4. Henry Weinstein, TV Exposure of Juror Throws Simpson Defense Off Stride,
THE PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Jan. 25, 1995, at 13A.
5. Id.
6. Roger Rosenblatt, A Nation of Pained Hearts, TIME, Oct. 16, 1995, at 41, 41.
7. So much so that one of the deputy district attorneys, William Hodgman, went
to the hospital with chest pains from an anxiety attack. See William Carlsen, Ailing
DA Held Overnight for Observation, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 26, 1995, at A7; see also
Hodgman Returns to Behind-Scenes Work in Simpson Trial, AP, Feb. 9, 1995, avail-
able in WESTLAW, 1995 WL 4361982.
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ever, a foregone conclusion.' If Ferguson had allowed attorney NMI-
liam Kunstler to continue to represent him,9 he very well could have
been found not guilty by reason of insanity and been committed to a
mental institution.'0 Although both of these cases are strange for
many reasons, the odd disparity of representation is especially strik-
ing: The Simpson case is as odd for the plethora of lawyers as the
Ferguson case is for the dearth of them.
Somewhere between these two cases lies the reality of the prac-
tice of criminal law in the courts of this country, where as many as
ninety-three percent of the defendants are indigent and appointed
an attorney by the court." Through television cop shows and court-
room dramas the right to have a court-appointed attorney has be-
come so well known and accepted that one sometimes forgets that
the right is but thirty-two years young. 2
8. Victims came one after the other, answered Ferguson's questions, and identi-
fied him as the perpetrator. Pat Milton, Train Shooter Found Guilty: Accused Who
Acted as Own Attorney Convicted on Six Counts of Murder, S.F. EXAMtNEL Feb. 19,
1995, at Al. "The first person shot on the train, Maryanne Phillips, coolly told Fer-
guson: 'I saw you shoot me'-a surreal scene that was repeated over and over in the
Long Island courtroom." Id.
9. The famous, self-proclaimed "radical lawyer" William Kunstler, along with his
partner Ron Kuby, represented Ferguson initially. Julia M. Klein, Kunstler. Still a
Crusader, DALLAs MORNING NEWS, Oct. 27, 1994, at 15C. They proposed to claim
that Ferguson was insane and that he killed because of black rage. Milton, supra
note 8, at Al. Ferguson rejected this defense and fired Kunstler and Kuby. Id.
Kunstler, who had also represented Martin Luther King, the Chicago Seven, Leo-
nard Peltier, and John Gotti, died September 4, 1995. Larry McShane, Kunstler's
Crusading Heir Apparent Lunges into Future, Grateful for Past, FORT VORTH STAR-
TELEGRAM, Nov. 12, 1995, at 7.
10. Ferguson revealed his defense when he said, "'The evidence will show that
Colin Ferguson was in fact a well-meaning passenger on the train.... Like any
other passenger he dozed off-having the weapon in a bag. At that point someone
... took the weapon out of the bag and proceeded to shoot.'" Van Biema, supra
note 3, at 66.
11. BuREAU OF JUST. STATS., INDIGENT DEFENsE 3-4 (Feb. 1996).
12. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (holding that state courts must
provide counsel to indigent criminal defendants). Judge Bertelsman of the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky provides some insight into
the practice of court appointment around the time Gideon was decided:
The present writer, who came to the bar in 1961, was appointed to defend
many of the criminal cases in the court in those years. The custom was for
the Clerk of the Court to get on the telephone and call all of the young
attorneys on the first day of the term with the message, "The judge wants
to see you." When the young attorney arrived, instead of engaging in a
tete-a-tete with the eminent occupant of the bench, he was told to stand
with one or more defendants and defend them, and that the cases were
going to trial that afternoon or the next morning. No compensation or
expenses of the attorney were paid.
United States v. Algie, 503 F. Supp. 783, 795 (E.D. Ky. 1980). All of Judge
Bertelsman's cases resulted in guilty pleas. Id.
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This Comment will examine briefly the history of the right to
counsel and the accompanying right to the effective assistance of
counsel in this country. At the time the Sixth Amendment was in-
cluded in the Bill of Rights, the United States rejected the English
practice of denying the right to counsel to those accused of felonies
while granting the right to those charged with misdemeanors.' 3
People in the United States have enjoyed the right to counsel in all
criminal cases, felonies and misdemeanors, since 1791.1' Yet in a
very real and dangerous sense, the courts have reversed the course
of history and adopted the upside-down English view of the right to
counsel.15 Just as the English denied counsel when the charge was
serious-when counsel was most necessary-now in the United
States, the courts deny the protection of the right to effective assist-
ance of counsel when the case is strong against the defendant-
when counsel is most necessary. A criminal defendant is more
likely to be protected from having an incompetent attorney if the
case against him is weak.
This Comment is concerned primarily with analyzing Maine's in-
digent criminal defense delivery system and with seeking a working
definition of effective assistance of counsel. Unfortunately, the
courts are not helpful in this attempt, largely because the courts dif-
ferentiate between constitutionally effective assistance of counsel
and adequate or competent assistance of counsel.'6 At times the
courts consider incompetent counsel constitutionally effective. Be-
cause the courts are not helpful in guiding the behavior and per-
formance of criminal defense attorneys, one must look to other
sources to determine how a criminal defense attorney should pro-
vide quality representation for criminal defendants. This Comment
will turn to the American Bar Association (ABA) and other com-
mentators for guidance.
What follows from knowing how an adequate defense attorney
performs is an inquiry into the type of delivery system that will best
ensure such behavior on a consistent basis. This Author accepts as
true that society should seek to eliminate the possibility that crimi-
nal defendants, the vast majority of whom are indigent, may be sub-
jected to the assistance of incompetent lawyers. This Comment will
look at the ABA's guiding principles for establishing an effective
defense delivery system. It also will look at the well-respected New
13. For a historical treatment of the right to counsel in Anglo-American law, see
WILLIAM M. BEANEY, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN AMERICAN COURTS 8-26 (1955)
and Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 60-66 (1932).
14. The Bill of Rights was ratified effective December 15, 1791.
15. It is worth remembering the words of Blackstone, "'For upon what face of
reason ... can that assistance [of counsel] be denied to save the life of a man, which
yet is allowed him in prosecutions for every petty trespass?'" Powell v. Alabama,
287 U.S. at 60-61 (quoting 4 BLACKSTONE 355).
16. See infra part III.
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Hampshire Public Defender's Office. Maine's court appointment
"system" will be measured against these two guide posts.
This Comment will urge Maine to reexamine its method of pro-
viding indigent criminal representation and urge the adoption of a
public defender program, or, at the very least, a more structured
court appointment system. Maine's "system" does not adequately
protect a criminal defendant's right to effective counsel. Mostly
poor and limited in education, criminal defendants have no voice of
their own.' 7 Moreover, society considers criminal defendants ene-
mies of an orderly and peaceful society.18 Society's natural instinct
is to destroy its enemies. Created by a people determined to limit
the power of the majority of society over the individual, the United
States Constitution provides the individual with protection from this
natural instinct. The defense attorney is that primary protection; he
is the voice of the defendant. It is his responsibility to ensure that
the power of the government is checked vigilantly and vigorously
through competent testing of the Government's case. If the lawyer
is muted by his own incompetence, the defendant will have no voice
and the government will remain unchecked. The courts' complicity
in this muting should be rejected by a people determined to protect
the individual from the tyranny of the society. The bare minimum
that the United States Supreme Court and the Maine Supreme Judi-
cial Court say the United States Constitution requires is not consis-
tent with the principles of liberty and justice on which this country
was founded. Maine must adopt a system that, by design, will en-
sure the consistent provision of quality representation for indigent
criminal defendants, who represent the overwhelming majority of
criminal defendants making their way through the justice system.' 9
II. SETTING SAIL: THE RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE
OF COUNSEL 2 0
The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides, "In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to... have
17. While Attorney General, Robert Kennedy observed, "' "The poor man
charged with crime has no lobby." "' Stephen B. Bright, The Politics of Crime and
the Death Penalty: Not "Soft on Crime " But Hard on the Bill of Rights, 39 ST. Louis
U. LJ. 479, 483 (1995) (quoting ANTHONY Lawis, GIDEON's TRuMPET 211 (1964)).
18. Perhaps only convicted criminals should be considered enemies of society.
While the Constitution recognizes a world of difference between defendants and the
convicted, society and the Supreme Court do not. Cf Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520,
533 (1979) ("The presumption of innocence is a doctrine that allocates the burden of
proof in criminal trials .... But it has no application to a determination of the rights
of a pretrial detainee during confinement before his trial has even begun.").
19. BuREAu OF JusT. STATS., supra note 11, at 2-3.
20. This Author maintains that our adversarial criminal justice system vas
established upon the assumption that the objective truth of an allegation will most
often be arrived at through a process of partisan advocacy. There are times,
however, when the objective truth will not be produced. If one submits to this
1996]
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the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.""1 While defendants in
this country have had the right to the assistance of a lawyer since
1791, for the longest part of our history, access to that right de-
pended upon the ability to afford an attorney or the luck of finding
one who would work for free. It was not until 141 years after the
ratification of the Sixth Amendment that the U.S. Supreme Court,
in Powell v. Alabama,' recognized that a defendant "requires the
guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against
him." 3 In Powell, three black defendants charged with rape were
appointed counsel in a cursory fashion and were represented sini-
larly.14 The Court reversed the convictions based on a violation of
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The de-
fendants were found to have been denied a fair trial, and thus due
process, because they were denied "an effective appointment of
counsel."'  The appointment was not "effective" because the coun-
sel did not represent the defendants from the time of arraignment
through to the beginning of their trial.16 The Court held that in a
capital case against an ignorant, feeble-minded, or illiterate defend-
ant "it is the duty of the court ... to assign counsel for him as a
necessary requisite of due process of law ....
process of "truth" finding, one must accept that the "truth" of any allegation exists
only when it has been subjected to the adversarial process, which can create a
difference between "legal guilt" and "actual guilt." While the victims of crimes may
be concerned with "actual guilt," the Constitution demands that the criminal justice
system concern itself only with "legal guilt." To establish "legal guilt," the system
and the Constitution provide rules to guide the allegation through the process.
Therefore, this Author defines "justice" as the result achieved when the process
works according to these rules. A "fair trial" can be achieved only through the
proper execution of the system using these rules. If the system is not adversarial, the
truth of the allegation cannot be discovered. Courts do not always act as if they
accept these definitions, although at times they speak as if they do.
Stephen B. Bright, Director of the Southern Center for Human Rights, said:
The suggestion that the most precious rights that we have-the right to be
free from search and seizures of our persons and our homes, the right to
remain silent, the right to a fair trial by an impartial jury, and the other
provisions of the Bill of Rights-are just technicalities is another sad aspect
of the crime debate today....
Process is important. Fairness is important. The way in which society
selects those who will live and those who will die is important.
Bright, supra note 17, at 490.
21. U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
22. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
23. l at 69.
24. Id. at 58. "One of the lawyers was a drunk and the other was senile." Bright,
supra note 17, at 482.
25. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. at 71.
26. Id at 57.
27. Id at 71.
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Six years after Powell, the Supreme Court, in Johnson v. Zerbst, I
stated that "the Sixth Amendment withholds from the federal
courts, in all criminal proceedings, the power and authority to de-
prive an accused of his life or liberty unless he has or waives the
assistance of counsel."29 The Court continued the message of Pow-
ell, which planted the seeds of the assumption existing today that a
lawyer is necessary for justice, when it said:
The purpose of the constitutional guaranty of a right to coun-
sel is to protect an accused from convictions resulting from his
own ignorance of his legal and constitutional rights, and the
guaranty would be nullified by a determination that an ac-
cused's ignorant failure to claim his rights removes the protec-
tions of the Constitution. 30
Just four years after Johnson, however, in Betts v. Brady,31 the
Supreme Court explicitly denied this protection to defendants in
state courts. The Court held that the right to counsel was not a fun-
damental right and therefore should not be imposed on the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment. 32
It was not until 1963, in Gideon v. Wainwright,3 3 that the right to
court-appointed counsel was extended to defendants in state courts.
Charged with breaking and entering, Clarence Earl Gideon stood
before a state court judge, asked for the assistance of a lawyer, and
was denied. 4 He filed a writ of habeas corpus in the Florida
Supreme Court and helped change the course of the United States
criminal justice system. The Gideon Court overturned Betts and
held that "any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a
lawyer cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for
him."'35 This "obvious truth ' 36 was recognized 172 years after the
ratification of the Sixth Amendment.
Since Gideon, the Supreme Court has clarified that the right to a
court-appointed counsel extends to any case in which a person may
28. 304 U.S. 458 (1938) (remanded to determine if defendant met his burden, in
habeas corpus action, of showing that he had not knowingly and intelligently waived
his right to counsel).
29. Id at 463.
30. Id at 465.
31. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
32. Id at 473.
33. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
34. The judge said:
Mr. Gideon, I am sorry, but I cannot appoint Counsel to represent you in
this case. Under the laws of the State of Florida, the only time the Court
can appoint Counsel to represent a Defendant is when that person is
charged with a capital offense. I am sorry, but I will have to deny your
request to appoint Counsel to defend you in this case.
Id. at 337.
35. Id at 344.
36. Id
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be imprisoned, without regard to the class of the crime.37 In 1970, in
McMann v. Richardson,3 1 the Court held that the right to counsel is
concomitantly the right to effective assistance of counsel.39 The
Court stated that "if the right to counsel.., is to serve its purpose,
defendants cannot be left to the mercies of incompetent counsel
.... Twenty-six years after this statement defendants have yet to
receive the protection promised; if the case against them is strong,
courts abandon defendants to the mercy of incompetent counsel.TI
III. A JOURNEY INTO NIGHT: THE LEGAL STANDARD FOR
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
At one time, courts uniformly applied a "farce and mockery"
standard to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. 2 Maine
adopted that standard in Bennett v. State.43 By 1976, only three cir-
cuits still required a defendant to demonstrate that his counsel was
"so inept that the trial [was] a 'farce and a mockery of justice.' ""u
This doctrine was replaced by the "reasonably competent attorney"
standard,45 which required that "[tihe claimed inadequacy must be a
serious incompetency that falls measurably below the performance
ordinarily expected of fallible lawyers."46 While the burden to meet
this standard is lower than that for the "farce and mockery" stan-
dard, the standard remains as vague as any reasonableness test.
Only through the application of the test by the courts to specific
case situations will the standard take on any meaning.
Maine abandoned the "farce and mockery" standard in 1981. In
its place, the Law Court applied the "reasonably competent assist-
ance" standard in Lang v. Murch.47 Representing a man charged
with unlawful sexual contact, defense counsel failed to challenge
four jurors who had sat on a jury the previous day that had found
37. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972) (reasoning that simply because
the Sixth Amendment had exceeded common law principles, the Sixth Amendment
was not intended to eradicate them).
38. 397 U.S. 759 (1970).
39. Id at 771.
40. Id.
41. See infra part IV.
42. See Diggs v. Welch, 148 F.2d 667, 670 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
43. 161 Me. 489, 214 A.2d 667 (1965).
44. United States v. Decoster, 624 F.2d 196, 219 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (Decoster III)
(MacKinnon, J., concurring) (quoting Diggs v. Welch, 148 F.2d at 670). At the time
that Decoster III was decided, only the First, Second, and Tenth Circuits still fol-
lowed the "farce and mockery" standard.
45. Id at 206.
46. Id at 208. The D.C. Circuit adopted the language of Commonwealth v.
Saferian, 315 N.E.2d 878, 883 (Mass. 1974).
47. 438 A.2d 914, 915 (Me. 1981) (adopting the language of United States v.
Decoster, 624 F.2d at 206, and United States v. Bosch, 584 F.2d 1113, 1121 (1st Cir.
1978)).
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another defendant guilty of the same offense. Defense counsel's er-
ror occurred despite ample opportunity to discover the possible
problem. The court concluded that the new standard was required
by both state and federal constitutions.' The Law Court accepted
the habeas justice's finding that the "representation falls short of the
lower parameter of 'the range of competence demanded of attor-
neys in criminal cases.' ,4 Despite such a finding, the case was re-
manded to determine if the "prior jury service of the four jurors had
a likelihood of affecting the outcome of the ... trial."5
A court's finding of inadequate service by a criminal defense at-
torney does not end the inquiry. The Law Court in Lang adopted a
two-prong test: "(1) Has there been a serious incompetence, ineffi-
ciency or inattention of counsel... ? (2) Has such ineffective repre-
sentation by counsel likely deprived the defendant of an otherwise
available substantial ground of defense?"'" The burden of persuad-
ing the court on both of these questions falls on the defendant.'
The Lang standard remains the law in Maine. 3 It is, however,
necessary to examine the federal standard for ineffective assistance
for at least two reasons. First, convicted defendants have the right
to file habeas corpus petitions in federal court after they have ex-
hausted state remedies.' Second, state courts must follow Supreme
Court precedent when deciding cases based on the Sixth Amend-
ment of the U.S. Constitution. It is useful to begin by looking at the
Decoster decisions from which Maine borrowed the standard. The
case offers a framework for understanding attitudes to the entire
issue of the right to effective counsel and the protection against inef-
fective counsel. Following the discussion of Decoster is an examina-
tion of Strickland v. Washington5' in which the U.S. Supreme Court
established a stringent standard that would make it all but impossi-
ble to succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
A. United States v. Decoster
The plurality opinion from the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia in United States v. Decosters6 is remarkable
48. Lang v. Murch, 438 A.2d at 916.
49. 1d. at 916 n.5 (quoting Lang v. Murch (Me. Super. Ct.. 1980) (habeas corpus
proceeding)).
50. Id. at 916.
51. Id. at 915 (citing Commonwealth v. Saferian, 315 N.E.2d 878, 883 (1974)).
52. Before the U.S. Supreme Court decided Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668 (1984), circuit discord existed on the proper imposition of the burden of proof in
ineffective assistance of counsel claims. See infra notes 86-127 and accompanying
text for a discussion of Strickland.
53. Lagassee v. State, 655 A.2d 328, 329 (Me. 1995).
54. See infra notes 137-139 and accompanying text.
55. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
56. 624 F.2d 196 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
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reading for many reasons.57 In each of the four main opinions, the
judges make statements that provide insight into why they fashioned
the rule as they did. It is clear that the court struggled to create a
standard and a test that would promote and preserve the integrity of
the criminal justice system. The case is a treasure largely because it
provides well articulated views of four possible approaches to the
problem of incompetent counsel. The court's disagreements con-
cern not the first prong of the test but rather the second prong, spe-
cifically the imposition of the burden of proving prejudice.58
In the lead opinion, Judge Leventhal adopted a two-prong test:
The claimed inadequacy must be a serious incompetency that
falls measurably below the performance ordinarily expected of
fallible lawyers. And the accused must bear the initial burden
of demonstrating a likelihood that counsel's inadequacy af-
fected the outcome of the trial. Once the appellant has made
this initial showing, the burden passes to the government, and
the conviction cannot survive unless the government demon-
strates that it is not tainted by the deficiency, and that in fact
no prejudice resulted.59
Judge Leventhal moderated his test by requiring a showing of a
"likelihood" or probability that defense counsel's incompetence af-
fected the outcome. The court declined to require a defendant to
show a "substantial likelihood" or that the chances were "more
likely than not" that the outcome would have been different. Judge
Leventhal and the three judges joining him did not wish to impose
"an undue burden on the defense.... [They did] not require that
defendant bear the burden of proving actual prejudice."60 The de-
fendant's burden was one of production, the ultimate burden of per-
suasion being on the Government.
Judge Leventhal based his approach on his recognition of the
criminal justice system's failings and the desire to establish some
middle ground that would allow for the maintenance of the adver-
57. Not the least remarkable thing about the case is its length, 150 pages in the
Federal Reporter.
58. The court also was divided on the need for the development of articulated,
specific duties to be imposed by the courts. United States v. Decoster, 624 F.2d at
215-16, 275-77.
59. Id. at 208. The Government had to demonstrate no prejudice in accordance
with Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967) (holding that before a court can find
that a constitutional error is harmless, that there was not a reasonable possibility
that the error had contributed to the conviction, the court must declare that the
error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt). If the accused established a consti-
tutional violation, "the government must show beyond a reasonable doubt that there
has been no prejudice in fact." Id. at 208 n.74. However, if something less than a
constitutional violation was perceived by the court, it could accept less than the
Chapman requirement to find the error harmless. Id.
60. Id. at 215.
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sary system as well as for the protection of constitutional rights.6"
With humility, Judge Leventhal wrote that "It]he adversary system,
warts and all, has worked to provide a salutary protection for the
rights of the accused." 2 While he recognized the problem of incom-
petent counsel, he responded in traditional "judicial restraint" fash-
ion and called for the assistance from the legislature and the bar to
cure the situation.63
In a concurring opinion, Judge MacKinnon and the two judges
joining him believed that the defendant should have to demonstrate
"substantial unfair prejudice to his defense resulting from a substan-
tial violation of duty owed him by his counsel."' The natural effect
of such a test would be few reversals. Judge MacKinnon's test re-
quired a showing of "actual injury"65 and not simply the likelihood
of prejudice. Showing mere prejudice was insufficient; a showing of
substantial unfair prejudice was required.
Judge MacKinnon's proposed high standard intends its conse-
quences, which is to say that he proposed a high standard that would
produce few reversals because he wished to see few cases reversed.
The intended consequences originated in the belief that "under the
Criminal Justice Act most defendants in this court are as well, if not
better represented than the Government." 66 Judge MacKinnon also
stated, "[lt is my view that Decoster's lawyer concluded that he was
guilty... [and] [u]nder such circumstances, an extensive investiga-
tion was not warranted."'67 Clearly, Judge MacKinnon developed
his test while under the delusion that incompetent counsel was not a
problem. Judge MacKinnon also seemed to award defense counsel
the discretion to be judge and jury of his own client.6s
61. Id. at 216-17. Judge Leventhal did not like Judge Bazelon's call for "categori-
cal rules governing the assistance of counsel." Id. at 216. He cautioned against any
rule that would lead to "inevitable and increasing intrusion into the development
and presentation of the defense case by the trial judge, and ... by the prosecution."
Id-
62. Id. at 208 (emphasis added). Leventhal also wrote that "[c]ertainly there is
need for the allocation of additional resources. Certainly there is need to cull out
incompetent counsel." Id. at 217.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 232 (emphasis added).
65. Id. at 245.
66. Id. at 244.
67. Id. at 233-34.
68. MacKinnon revealed himself more when he took umbrage at the dissent's
slamming of defense attorneys for the indigent and its concern for the poor
We specifically resent the inference that appointed counsel scrimp on re-
questing investigative expense because of an alleged fear that their own
fees would be lessened....
The dissent purports to be concerned with "equal justice" for the poor.
But its myopic view of justice for the public overlooks justice for the public,




Judge Robinson, writing alone, believed that the effect of a law-
yer's incompetence should not be an element of the claim of ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel.
I think the claim is established by a suitable showing that
counsel defaulted on an obligation owed the accused, and that
any asserted lack of injury therefrom is to be treated here just
as ... any other instance of curable constitutional error. This
means.., that the burden rests on the Government to prove
[harmless error] ... beyond a reasonable doubt.69
Judge Robinson also stated, "Proof of an actual or potential harm is
not normally an element of the showing prerequisite to establishing
a violation of a right specifically enumerated in the Constitution."7
This view is a grand, albeit logical, departure from the two-prong
test. His test inevitably would result in more reversals.
Judge Robinson's view presents courts with a problem because no
claim of ineffective counsel, if found to be constitutionally signifi-
cant, can easily and honestly be found harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt.7' Because the right to counsel is so important to the asser-
tion of all other rights,7" if there is a finding of incompetence that
amounts to a denial of the right to counsel, one would think that a
court would be less likely to say, or the Government less able to
prove, that the violation was harmless. Judge Robinson, however,
did concur in the result because he believed that the record estab-
lished harmless error.7 3 He believed that any efforts by the lawyer
would have been unfruitful in light of the Government's proof.74
Although Judge Robinson's view is logical,75 his test presents the
courts with another problem because it goes against the courts' pol-
Id at 244. Judge MacKinnon obviously believed that defense counsel, as defense
counsel, should care about the victims of crime. Defense counsel, however, should
be concerned only with equal justice for their clients.
69. Id. at 261 (footnotes omitted). The Supreme Court held that "constitutional
error... casts on someone other than the person prejudiced by it a burden to show
that it was harmless.... Before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless,
the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt." Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).
70. United States v. Decoster, 624 F.2d at 258.
71. Judge Robinson makes a distinction saying that "ineffective assistance is not
far removed from total lack of assistance, which frequently calls for automatic rever-
sal." Id. at 261.
72. Justice Stevens endorsed the view that "'[o]f all the rights that an accused
person has, the right to ... counsel is by far the most pervasive for it affects his
ability to assert any other rights he may have.'" United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S.
648, 654 (1984) (quoting Walter V. Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal Proce-
dure, 70 HARV. L. REv. 1, 8 (1956)).
73. United States v. Decoster, 624 F.2d at 262. Judge Robinson believed defense
counsel's assistance to be "constitutionally ineffective." Id.
74. Id. at 263.
75. Judge Robinson's approach is logical because of the procedural posture of the
case. Decoster appealed his case directly. Judge Robinson points out that normally
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icy of awarding attorneys wide latitude and discretion. Judge
Robinson's test would force courts to involve themselves in the un-
comfortable task of criticizing lawyers' actions;76 conversely, the
two-prong test does not because a claim can be dismissed under the
prejudice prong without ever discussing the performance prong.77
Judge Bazelon, dissenting, believed that courts should look at the
attorney's performance. He wanted to establish a set of "articulated
duties"78 that an attorney and the presiding judge should follow. 79
a defendant need not prove prejudice to establish a violation of the Constitution. Id.
at 258-59. Judge Leventhal believed, however, that it did not matter whether the
attack on the conviction was direct or collateral; the test should remain the same in
either case. Id. at 207-08. Later, the U.S. Supreme Court weighed in on the debate
when it said that "the right to effective assistance of counsel is recognized not for its
own sake, but because of its effect on the ability of the accused to receive a fair
trial." United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 658. The Court ignores its own basic
premise that a reasonably effective lawyer is the accused's key to all his rights in the
process and is fundamental to the possibility of a fair trial. The Court essentially
says that if the Government's case is strong enough, having a lawyer is better than
having no lawyer, even if your lawyer "failed miserably in responding to his obliga-
tion[s] ...." United States v. Decoster, 624 F.2d at 262.
A discussion of the different burdens imposed on defendants in a habeas or post-
conviction proceeding in contrast to a direct appeal is beyond the scope of this Com-
ment. Because a habeas proceeding is a civil proceeding and the defendant is like a
plaintiff, requiring the defendant to show harm is perhaps appropriate. O'Neal v.
McAninch, 115 S. Ct. 992, 996 (1995). This makes sense because the defendant must
show that his continued confinement is in violation of the Constitution or the laws of
the United States. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c)(3), 2254(a) (1992). There is, however, a
difference between recognition of a violation and the granting of relief. While one
can understand the burden imposed to obtain relief, why a defendant is required to
show prejudice to establish a constitutional violation on direct appeal remains un-
clear. Perhaps to avoid this question-as well as to provide for a proceeding that
allows for testimony-the Maine Law Court strongly prefers that ineffective assist-
ance claims be handled in a post-conviction proceeding. State v. Wells, 658 Aid 654
(Me. 1995).
76. See supra Judge Leventhal's comments in notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
77. In Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 60 (1985), the U.S. Supreme Court said that
it was unnecessary for it to rule on counsel's performance "because in the present
case we conclude that petitioner's allegations are insufficient to satisfy the ... re-
quirement of prejudice." The New Hampshire Supreme Court encouraged review-
ing courts to use the prejudice prong as a threshold question. State v. Wisowaty. 627
A.2d 572 (N.H. 1993).
78. In Decoster , Judge Bazelon adopted an approach from the Fourth Circuit
and stated:
(In Generao-Counsel should be guided by the American Bar Association
Standards for the Defense Function. They represent the legal profession's
own articulation of guidelines for the defense of criminal cases.
(Specifically)-(1) Counsel should confer with his client without delay and
as often as necessary to elicit matters of defense, or to ascertain that poten-
tial defenses are unavailable. Counsel should discuss fully potential strate-
gies and tactical choices with his client.
(2) Counsel should promptly advise his client of his rights and take all ac-
tions necessary to preserve them.... Counsel should also be concerned
with the accused's right to be released from custody pending trial, and be
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He was not insensitive to the attorney's professionalism; he was,
however, not afraid to have the courts take on the job of defining
effective assistance. 80 He stated that "[b]y focusing exclusively on
the consequences of counsel's dereliction, their [the majority] ap-
proach encourages an attorney who believes that his client is guilty
to 'cut corners' ....81 Believing as he did that "a great many-if
not most-indigent defendants do not receive the effective assist-
ance of counsel guaranteed them by the Sixth Amendment," it is
not surprising that Judge Bazelon states, "If the Sixth Amendment is
to serve a central role in eliminating second-class justice for the
poor, then it must proscribe second-class performances by counsel,
whatever the consequences in a particular case." '83 This perspective
prepared, where appropriate, to make motions for pre-trial psychiatric ex-
amination or for the suppression of evidence.
(3) Counsel must conduct appropriate investigations, both factual and
legal, to determine what matters of defense can be developed.
United States v. Decoster, 487 F.2d 1197, 1203-04 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Decoster 1) (in-
ternal cites omitted).
79. United States v. Decoster, 624 F.2d 196, 275-77 (D.C. Cir. 1976). Judge
Bazelon's dissent, which represented the majority view in United States v. Decoster,
487 F.2d 1197 (D.C. Cir. 1973), is a wonderfully liberal and impassioned approach to
the incredible problem of incompetent criminal defense counsel. Judge Bazelon ex-
presses his perspective when he states:
[T]he majority's decision ignores the sordid reality that the kind of slov-
enly, indifferent representation provided Willie Decoster is uniquely the
fate allotted the poor .... I cannot accept a system that conditions a de-
fendant's right to a fair trial on his ability to pay for it. Like Justice Black, I
believe that "Itjhere can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man
gets depends on the amount of money he has." The Constitution forbids it.
Morality condemns it. I dissent.
lId at 264 (quoting Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956)).
80. "The duties articulated herein are meant as a starting point for the court to
develop, on a case by case basis, clearer guidelines for courts and for lawyers as to
the meaning of effective assistance." United States v. Decoster, 487 F.2d at 1203
n.23.
81. United States v. Decoster, 624 F.2d at 266 (emphasis added). Counsel be-
lieved that Decoster was guilty and failed to do any pre-trial investigation. Counsel
did not even interview the state's only witnesses, two police officers. He also failed
to respond to the prosecution's alibi-notice demand, even though counsel indicated,
at trial, a possibility of relying on an alibi. Id. at 269 n.34. Decoster's lawyer had
been appointed, in 1971, in a purse-snatching case. In that case, counsel did no pre-
trial investigation because presumably he believed his client guilty. The defendant
was sentenced to two to six years despite "indisputable evidence" that he had been
somewhere else, evidence that would have been discovered if any investigation had
been done. Granted a new trial through other counsel, the charges were dropped,
but the defendant spent a year in jail. l at 284 n.105.
82. David L. Bazelon, The Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42 U. CIN, L. REv. 1
(1973). Judge Bazelon suggested that the number could be as high as 50%. Id. at
22-23.
83. United States v. Decoster, 624 F.2d at 275.
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forms the basis for Judge Bazelon's test, which would not require
the defendant to show prejudice.1
The Decoster opinions presented the range of attitudes towards
the issue of the incompetent assistance of counsel, criminal defend-
ants, and the criminal justice system. Although judges' attitudes
about society and policy often direct their judicial opinions and the
formulation of legal standards, the danger of doing this with the is-
sue of effective assistance of counsel is that it involves a right so
fundamental to the proper execution of the process by which the
government deprives a person of his life or liberty. Logic is a more
appropriate means by which to direct opinion. Judge Robinson cor-
rectly stated, "Ineffective assistance of counsel has a built-in poten-
tial for harm to the client. The right to effective assistance thus
shares with most other constitutional guaranties a characteristic
which normally obviates any need for proof of prejudice .... " As
the U.S. Supreme Court shows in Strickland v. Washington. it be-
lieves that policy should triumph over logic and a constitutional
right should depend on whether or not the government has a good
case against a defendant.
B. Strickland v. Washington86
To put to rest the controversy over a standard for determining
ineffective assistance the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in
the case of David Leroy Washington. Against his attorney's advice,
David Washington confessed and pleaded guilty to three capital
murders. Washington's counsel became "immobilized by a 'hope-
less feeling' upon learning that Mr. Washington had confessed ....
[He commented that] he did not feel that 'there was anything which
[he] ... could do which was going to save David Washington from
his fate.' "87 Counsel conducted no pre-sentence investigation and
failed to order any psychiatric testing or pre-sentencing reports, de-
spite his belief that there was "an inexplicable difference" between
Washington's personality and the crimes he committed.s Defense
84. Judge Bazelon suggested that after the defendant showed a substantial viola-
tion of one of the "articulable duties," the government must establish that no preju-
dice resulted. Id He also recognized that a defendant might have trouble proving
prejudice because of a lawyer's incompetence. Id. at 267.
85. Id at 260.
86. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
87. Brief of Respondent, Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (No. 82-
1554), available in LEXIS, Genfed Library, Briefs File.
88. Id. The lawyer's reaction flies in the face of the ABA command that -de-
fense counsel in a capital case must, given this extraordinary penalty, make ex-
traordinary efforts on behalf of the accused.... [D]efense counsel should endeavor
... to leave no stone unturned ...." ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE
PROSECUTION FUNCtION AND DEzaNsE FuNctioN Standard 4-1.2 commentary at
123 (3d ed. 1993) [hereinafter ABA STANDARDS]. The ABA reminds lawyers that
"advocacy is not for the timid, the meek or the retiring." Id at 122.
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counsel relied solely on his own sentencing argument and the sub-
stance of the plea colloquy between Washington and the judge.
Washington's lawyer threw his client on the mercy of the court and
hoped that his life could be spared through the use of the state's
psychological report and the fact that his client had confessed his
brutal crimes to a judge whose "views on the importance of owning
up to one's crimes were well known to counsel., 89
In reversing the Fifth Circuit's reversal of Washington's murder
conviction, the Court held that the "conduct of the respondent's
counsel ...cannot be found unreasonable." 90 The Court estab-
lished a two-prong test that requires the defendant to show that
first, "counsel's performance was deficient.... Second, the defend-
ant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the de-
fense." 91 The Court's standard is higher than that of Judge
Leventhal's test in Decoster because it requires a showing that
"there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofes-
sional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been differ-
ent."'  David Washington could have received relief if he had
shown the Court that there was a "reasonable probability that, ab-
sent the errors, the sentencer ... would have concluded that the
balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant
death." 93 David Washington could not do that and was put to death
within the year of the Strickland opinion.94
The Court reasoned that "[t]he benchmark for judging any claim
of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined
the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial can-
not be relied on as having produced a just result."9' 5 This test allows
a finding of a "just result" despite a showing that "counsel made
errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel'
guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment."96 Given the
Supreme Court's proclamations that the right to counsel is a funda-
89. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 699.
90. Id. at 698. In fact, the trial court said that "the argument and memorandum
given to the sentencing judge were 'admirable' in light of the overwhelming aggra-
vating circumstances and absence of mitigating circumstances." Id. at 676. Of
course, there were no mitigating circumstances because the lawyer the court ad-
mired did not look for any.
91. Id. at 687. Maine's test, established in Lang, also placed the complete burden
of production and persuasion on the defendant. Lang v. Murch, 438 A.2d 914, 916
(Me. 1981).
92. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 694.
93. Id. at 695.
94. June Preston, Fugitives and Foul Weather Mark 1984 in South, UPI, Dec. 25,
1984, available in LEXIS, Arcnws Library.
95. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 686.
96. Id. at 687.
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mental right and the key to proper access to all other rights,' this
result, which occurs regularly,9" is extraordinary.
The Court also claimed to be concerned with preserving the ad-
versary process to achieve "reliable" results, yet it acted contrary to
that objective. The Court believed that a "reliable result" can be
achieved when defense counsel is not participating as an adversary,
as "counsel" as the Constitution intended. According to the Court,
reliable results can be achieved when the Government has over-
whelming evidence against a defendant; it does not matter that the
evidence goes unchallenged.99 Under the Court's test in Strickland,
defense counsel is only necessary when the courts are unsure of the
defendant's guilt.100 The Court turns a blind eye to a dereliction of
duty by defense counsel if the Court is comfortable with its belief
that the defendant is guilty. This, of course, contravenes the founda-
tional principle of the adversary system the "truth," a "just result,"
and a "reliable result" can be achieved only when all three par-
ticipatory parties (the judge and jury, the prosecutor, and the de-
fense counsel) do their jobs well.
The stated rationale for the first prong of the test is the courts'
reluctance to second-guess lawyers, who are after all members of
their own profession. "Because of the difficulties inherent in mak-
ing the evaluation [of counsel's performance], a court must indulge a
strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide
range of reasonable professional assistance."'' In Decoster, Judge
Leventhal also expressed this reluctance.
The rationale for the requirement of the prejudice prong is less
clear.' The Court began its discussion of the need for the second
97. See supra note 72.
98. According to a study of Federal Circuit opinions, 41% of all ineffective assist-
ance claims brought after Strickland were denied for lack of prejudice. Only 4% of
post-Strickland claims were upheld. Floyd Feeney & Patrick G. Jackson, Public De-
fenders, Assigned Counse Retained Counse" Does the Type of Criminal Defense
Counsel Matter?, 22 RUTGERS W. 361, 426 (1991). A more recent study indicated
that, in the nine states and their corresponding federal district courts studied, only
1% or less of ineffective assistance claims were granted. Victor E. Flango & Patricia
McKenna, Federal Habeas Corpus Review of State Court Convictions, 31 CAL- W. L
REv. 237, 259-60 (1995).
99. As in Strickland, this test is especially harmful to a criminal defendant's rights
when defense counsel is responsible for the fact that the Government's evidence
seems so overwhelming. While the O.3. Simpson trial was unusual, it is a clear ex-
ample of how good lawyering can overcome overwhelming evidence.
100. The Court stated, "Moreover, a verdict or conclusion only weakly supported
by the record is more likely to have been affected by errors than one with over-
whelming record support." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S at 696.
101. Id. at 689. The Court also said: "[Tihe purpose of the effective assistance
guarantee... is not to improve the quality of legal representation, although that is a
goal of considerable importance to the legal system. The purpose is simply to ensure
that criminal defendants receive a fair trial." Id.
102. Justice Marshall, however, is very clear in his dissent when he states:
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prong by saying that an error by counsel does not warrant overturn-
ing a conviction if the error had no effect.' 3 This, however, does
not explain the requirement that the defendant show prejudice, in-
stead of requiring the Government prove no prejudice. The Court
goes on to say that because the "purpose of the Sixth Amendment
guarantee of counsel is to ensure that a defendant has the assistance
necessary to justify reliance on the outcome of the proceeding," the
errors of counsel "must be prejudicial" to rise to the level of a con-
stitutional harm.' ° Should it not be assumed that the proceeding is
unreliable if defense counsel is not "counsel" as the Constitution
intended? The Court does not think so. The Court explains its
"logic" by saying that it cannot and/or will not infer prejudice from
all errors by counsel. 0 5 Justice O'Connor wrote:
The government is not responsible for, and hence not able to
prevent, attorney errors that will result in reversal of a convic-
tion or sentence. Attorney errors come in an infinite variety
and are as likely to be utterly harmless in a particular case as
they are to be prejudicial. They cannot be classified according
to likelihood of causing prejudice. Nor can they be defined
with sufficient precision to inform defense attorneys correctly
just what conduct to avoid.10 6
Justice O'Connor incorrectly attempts, on behalf of the government,
to evade responsibility for the performance of lawyers. All attor-
neys are officers of the court; appointed attorneys are sanctioned
and paid by the courts; the courts are the means by which the gov-
ernment takes away life and liberty."0 7 Also, the possibility that er-
rors may be harmless as well as prejudicial does not explain the
[It is often very difficult to tell whether a defendant convicted after a trial
in which he was ineffectively represented would have fared better if his
lawyer had been competent. Seemingly impregnable cases can sometimes
be dismantled by good defense counsel. On the basis of a cold record, it
may be impossible for a reviewing court confidently to ascertain how the
government's evidence and arguments would have stood up against rebut-
tal and cross-examination by a shrewd, well-prepared lawyer. The difficul-
ties of estimating prejudice after the fact are exacerbated by the possibility
that evidence of injury to the defendant may be missing from the record
precisely because of the incompetence of defense counsel.
Ia at 710.
103. Id. at 691.
104. Id. at 691-92.
105. The Court need not infer prejudice from all errors. But when the errors are
substantial and counsel's performance is grossly inadequate, prejudice could very
easily be inferred.
106. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S at 693.
107. One of the beautiful things about our form of government is that, at least in
theory, the government is responsible for assuring that criminal defendants are ade-
quately represented by counsel who are not under the influence of the government.
Our form of government illustrates a commitment to the idea that it must protect us




prejudice requirement or the allocation of the burden. Further, the
lack of specificity of a standard is not an ample justification for a
prejudice prerequisite to a constitutional violation. Shouldn't an at-
torney know what conduct falls below that of the "prevailing profes-
sional norms?' 10 8 Nothing in the opinion answers the question why
prejudice must be shown, or why the defendant must show prejudice
if the court thinks an attorney error is wholly egregious, and may
leave a defendant without "counsel" as the Constitution intended.
Because the Strickland Court is not as free with expressing its per-
sonal feelings as was the Decoster court, one must look to the logical
results of the opinion, assume that the court intended the logical
results, and determine the court's rationale from that. The logical
result of the Strickland test is very few reversals.109 The majority in
Strickland presumably intended those results.
There are unpleasant possibilities for why the Court would want
to establish a test that would make reversals very rare. First, many
people, including judges, believe that most defendants are "actually
guilty." Second, people also believe that the Constitution was
meant to protect only the innocent from being convicted. Third,
courts know that the quality of representation for many, if not most,
criminal defendants is inadequate and a lower hurdle would result in
more reversals that would use already precious judicial resources.
Why waste the taxpayers' money and the courts' precious time with
a new trial that will only effect the same result?
First, many people find it easy to discount the impact of inade-
quate representation with the belief that most defendants are
guilty."0 That one is presumed innocent until a fair trial proves him
guilty does not concern them. Judge Bazelon offered a perspective
of this attitude when he stated:
It is the belief-rarely articulated, but, I am afraid, widely
held-that most criminal defendants are guilty anyway. From
this assumption it is a short path to the conclusion that the
quality of representation is of small account.... [T]his "guilty
anyway" syndrome underlies much of the current push for
greater "efficiency" in the criminal courts.... [W]hy allow
men who are "guilty anyway" to clutter the courts with all
sorts of difficult legal and constitutional questions?"'
To what else could Justice O'Connor be referring when she says that
a "just result" could be reached when the defense counsel was not
the "counsel" guaranteed by the Constitution?" 2 The belief that
108. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 688.
109. See Feeney & Jackson, supra note 98.
110. This Author has encountered this sentiment in numerous conversations
about the issue. Such views are aired unabashedly in law school classes by some law
students.
111. Bazelon, supra note 82, at 26.
112. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 686.
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most criminal defendants are "guilty anyway" allows the Court to
engage in a balancing of policies and values, instead of adhering log-
ically to the Constitution.
Second, related to the "guilty anyway" syndrome is the idea that
the Constitution is meant to protect only the "actually innocent"
from being convicted incorrectly, and not also to protect the "actu-
ally guilty" from being convicted improperly. The Constitution
surely requires both. Written to limit the power of government, the
Constitution requires that the system ensure that the guilty are
properly convicted also.113 Justice Marshall declared in dissent in
Strickland:
[T]he assumption on which the Court's holding rests is that the
only purpose of the constitutional guarantee of effective assist-
ance of counsel is to reduce the chance that innocent persons
will be convicted. In my view, the guarantee also functions to
ensure that convictions are obtained only through fundamen-
tally fair procedures." 4
Justice Black wrote eloquently, "The Sixth Amendment stands as a
constant admonition that if the constitutional safeguards it provides
be lost, justice will not 'still be done.' "115 Justice Brennan wrote,
"The constitutional rights of criminal defendants are granted to the
innocent and the guilty alike. Consequently, we decline to hold
either that the guarantee of effective assistance of counsel belongs
solely to the innocent or that it attaches only to matters affecting the
determination of actual guilt.""16 Denied the protection of such a
fundamental and important constitutional right, a person cannot,
and should not, be considered convicted properly.
The third possible rationale for the Court's test is that the Court
certainly must be aware of the problem of inadequate assistance of
counsel and fears an onslaught of ineffectiveness claims.' 17 The rate
of incompetence among trial lawyers has been estimated as high as
seventy-five percent."' Chief Justice Warren Burger believed that
"from one-third to one-half of the lawyers who appear in the serious
cases are not really qualified to render fully adequate representa-
tion." 9 Ramsey Clark, U.S. Attorney General under Lyndon
113. In Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 862 (1975), the Court seemed to
agree when it said that "[t]he very premise of our adversary system of criminal jus-
tice is that partisan advocacy on both sides of a case will best promote the ultimate
objective that the guilty be convicted and the innocent go free."
114. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 711.
115. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462 (1938).
116. Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 380 (1986).
117. Ineffective assistance claims on habeas petitions account for almost half of
the claims raised. Flango & McKenna, supra note 98, at 247.
118. Feeney & Jackson, supra note 98, at 427. Nevertheless, "[flrom the begin-
ning the claims of widespread incompetence have been sharply disputed." Id. at
397.
119. Id. at 396.
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Johnson, said, "In my judgment, from having been involved in a
number of those cases [of death row inmates] and reviewed many
more transcripts, seventy-five percent were deprived of the effective
assistance of counsel."' 2 Because of this belief and in spite of it,
the courts allow people to go to jail and to death when the key to all
of their rights, their lawyer, was for reasons of incompetence un-
available to them. 12
1
The Supreme Court must have been aware of these sentiments
and feared encouraging the "proliferation of ineffectiveness chal-
lenges"'" if it established a test that allowed only an examination of
the performance of defense counsel. The Court stated:
Criminal trials resolved unfavorably to the defendant would
increasingly come to be followed by a second trial, this one of
counsel's unsuccessful defense. Counsel's performance and
even willingness to serve could be adversely affected. Inten-
sive scrutiny of counsel and rigid requirements for acceptable
assistance could dampen the ardor and impair the indepen-
dence of defense counsel, discourage the acceptance of as-
signed cases, and undermine the trust between attorney and
client.123
Instead of addressing the true constitutional question, the Court
goes straight to the prejudice prong.124 While these fears possibly
could justify a healthy deference to counsel's actions, they do not
justify establishing a test that regularly ignores truly poor perform-
ances. Through the creation of this test, the Court injures the sys-
tem more deeply than if it created a test that allowed the system to
crash. The Court seems to believe that the system should be pre-
served even at the expense of its principles.
Instead of acting consistently with the theory of the system, the
Supreme Court is ruled by its concerns for the courts' ability to han-
dle cases and the attitude that few people will be hurt because most
defendants are guilty anyway. This Comment's primary purpose is
120. Ramsey Clark, The Lawyer's Duty of Loyalty: To the Client or to the Institu-
tion? 16 Loy. U. CHi. L.J. 459, 463 (1985).
121. Not more than 16% of ineffective assistance claims are upheld, and usually
the number is closer to 4 or 6% Feeney & Jackson, supra note 98, at 426.
122. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690 (1984).
123. Id
124. Id at 697. The real question should be whether the defendant received
counsel as the Constitution intended. The Court's two-prong test means that a find-
ing of a deprivation of a constitutional right, which usually is considered a constitu-
tional violation, is insufficient to constitute a violation of the Constitution. It would
be as if the Court said that a defendant had to show prejudice before the Court
would recognize that the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights were violated when
the police entered his home without a warrant. While it may make sense to allocate
the burden of showing prejudice to the defendant before he may obtain relief it




not to propose a solution to the problem with the Strickland test.' 25
The test indicates that the courts are unable or unwilling to fix the
problem of incompetent counsel. Nevertheless, this Author pro-
poses that the Supreme Court and the Maine Law Court abandon
the current requirement that a defendant show prejudice before a
constitutional violation is found to exist. This proposition rests not
only in the belief that the courts are wrong but also in the practical
consideration that the courts must preserve the system of justice and
ensure truly "just results." The legislatures and many lawyers are
unwilling to fix or are uninterested in the problem of proper repre-
sentation; they cannot be relied on to solve the problem alone. The
courts should recognize their responsibility for the lawyers that they
admit to the bar and that they appoint to represent indigent defend-
ants. The courts do not need to invade the role of defense counsel
completely, but neither should they abandon defendants to attor-
neys whose only qualification is their willingness to serve.126 As
Judge Bazelon said:
That the ultimate solution does not lie exclusively within the
province of the courts does not justify our ignoring the situa-
tion nor our accepting it as immutable. The people have be-
stowed upon the courts a trust: to ensure that the awesome
power of the State is not invoked against anyone charged with
a crime unless that individual had been afforded all the rights
guaranteed by the Constitution. We fail that trust if we sit by
silently while countless indigent defendants continue to be de-
prived of liberty without the effective assistance of counsel. 27
The courts cannot be timid about telling attorneys that they have
acted irresponsibly. The courts cannot continue to make excuses for
poor performances. If the courts are going to assign the term "tacti-
cal" to a lawyer's decision, the courts must do so only when the law-
yer is capable of making such a decision.
IV. THE CAPE OF No HOPE: INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE DEFINED
IN THE COURTS
While it is clear that criminal defendants have a Sixth Amend-
ment right to effective counsel, it is anything but clear in the courts
what it means to have effective counsel. What will satisfy the first
125. See William S. Geimer, A Decade of Strickland's Tin Horn: Doctrinal and
Practical Undermining of the Right to Counsel, 4 Wm. & MARY BILL OF Rrs. J. 91
(1995).
126. In Maine, there is no application process for court-appointed counsel. Also,
willingness is not the primary motive for some who take court appointments. With
the poor state of the job market, necessity has become a motivation for court-ap-
pointed attorneys.
127. United States v. Decoster, 624 F.2d 196, 300 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
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prong of the Strickland test?" 2 What is the measure of a lawyer
conducting a proper defense? The Strickland Court said that "the
proper measure of attorney performance remains simply reasona-
bleness under prevailing professional norms."' 2 9 A vice-president
of the Georgia Trial Lawyers Association said that, according to the
Strickland standard, if "you put a mirror under the court-appointed
attorney's nose, and if the mirror clouds up, that's adequate coun-
sel." 130 A lecturer at Loyola University said that providing effective
assistance of counsel "means you provide the best defense in order
to obtain the best result for your client.' 31 In Maine, effective
counsel is defined by what it is not: seriously incompetent, ineffi-
cient, and inattentive. 132 The Maine Law Court defers to an attor-
ney's tactical decisions unless they represent "manifest
unreasonableness," which is found if the defendant is denied a "sub-
stantial ground of defense." 33 The more one exanmines the cases
dealing with effective representation the more one understands that,
although the courts may desire defense counsel who can do more
than cloud up a mirror, the courts are willing to tolerate lawyers
who do little more in the courtrooms of the United States. What
follows is a look at cases dealing with claims of ineffective assistance
of counsel. One quickly realizes that the courts give attorneys no
direction and defendants little hope.
A. Procedure for Post-Conviction Review
In Maine, claims for ineffective assistance of counsel may be
brought either on direct appeal or collaterally pursuant to Rule 37
or Rules 65 through 78 of the Maine Rules of Criminal Procedure.
The Law Court states that ineffective assistance claims are "better
suited for post-conviction review." "a4 "When [such a claim] is raised
128. Of course, more important for the defendant is what will satisfy the second
prong of the Strickland test.
129. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984).
130. Stephen B. Bright, et al., Keeping Gideon from Being Blown Away, CJM?.
JusT., Winter 1990, at 10, 11. This quip was prompted by a defense attorney's fail-
ure, until the second day of trial, to recognize that the person sitting next to him was
not his client. Other instances that shock the conscience include the attorney that
had handled a number of capital cases and named Dred Scott and Miranda as the
two criminal cases with which he was most familiar. Yet another included the de-
fendant who was sentenced to death even though the first day of his trial was cut
short when the judge sent his lawyer to jail for the night because the lawyer was
drunk in the courtroom. Finally, there was the third year law student, who asked for
a moment to compose herself because she had never been in court before. She was
representing a defendant whose life was at stake. Id.
131. George Cotsirilos, The Lawyer's Duty of Loyalty: To the Client or to the
Institution? 16 Loy. U. CHt. L.J. 459, 470 (1984-85).
132. Pierce v. State, 463 A.2d 756, 758 (Me. 1983).
133. Kimball v. State, 490 A.2d 653, 657 (Me. 1985).
134. State v. Jordan, 659 A.2d 849, 851 (Me. 1995) (citing State v. Wells, 658 A.2d
654, 656 (Me. 1995)).
1996]
MAINE LAW REVIEW
on direct appeal, we will not consider the claim unless the record
reveals, beyond the possibility for rational disagreement, that the
defendant received inadequate representation."' 35 Whether the
claim is brought directly or collaterally, the defendant must prove
prejudice.136
At the federal level, a state or federal prisoner may file an appeal
or file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.' 3 7 Like the Law Court,
the First Circuit "has repeatedly held that collateral attack is the
preferred forum for such claims, since there is often no opportunity
to develop the necessary evidence where the claim is first raised on
direct appeal.' 38 State prisoners first must exhaust state remedies
before federal courts will entertain the petition.' 39
The procedural posture of the normal ineffective assistance of
counsel claim greatly alters the substantive right to effective assist-
ance of counsel. Habeas (called post-conviction in Maine) petition-
ers normally file their petitions pro se.' 40 After review of the
petition by a judge the petitioner may be appointed counsel, but not
necessarily. 14  While petitioners have access to law books, they are
unqualified to recognize or adequately state a claim that is likely to
get past the reviewing judge.' 4 The solution to the problem seems
to be the provision of habeas forms, which lead the petitioner
through the process even to the point of listing possible grounds for
relief.143 Whether the habeas forms really solve the problem is open
to debate. The fact remains that the courts relegate ineffective
assistance claims to a procedure where attorneys are not available in
the first stage of drafting the claim, which is arguably the most im-
portant step. It is irrelevant that courts do this largely for the practi-
cal reason that such claims require evidence to be adduced in a
hearing, a procedure unavailable at the direct appeal level. Those
wronged by an incompetent attorney hit a procedural brick wall.
What follows is an examination of what happens once the petitioner




137. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254-2255 (1988).
138. Knight v. United States, 37 F.3d 769, 774 (1st Cir. 1994).
139. Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 349 (1989).
140. Flango & McKenna, supra note 98, at 261.
141. Id. at 261 n.63; ME. R. CRiM. P. 69.
142. Maine Rules allow the reviewing justice to dismiss the petition summarily.
ME. R. CRIM. P. 70. In their study, Flango and McKenna found that about 75% of
state court petitions were dismissed or denied summarily without a reason. Flango
& McKenna, supra note 98, at 262. Maine Rule 70(b) requires that reasons be given
for a summary dismissal. ME. R. CRiM. P. 70.
143. Model Form for Use in Applications for Habeas Corpus Under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254; Model Form for Motions Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The forms tell petitioners




1. Kimball v. State
In Kimball v. State,' the Maine Law Court said that "[d]efense
counsel has a duty to conduct a 'reasonable amount' of pre-trial in-
vestigation."' 45 This duty, however, does not require a lawyer to
turn over every stone. Recognizing that "[t]rial counsel had a lim-
ited budget for investigation," the Law Court endorsed the post-
conviction justice's deference to defense counsel's choice to pursue
some evidence and ignore other.'" Despite the presence of a possi-
ble witness on a list of the victim's acquaintances, the witness was
not interviewed by defense counsel by the time of trial.1 47 A year
after the conviction the witness, a fellow inmate of the defendant,
came forward and claimed that he knew who had murdered the vic-
tim.'" Whether the witness was not contacted because of a lack of
resources or because of defense counsel's incompetence is not clear.
Why the witness did not come forward on his own also is not ex-
plained. It is clear that, if the witness's story was not concocted with
the aid of the defendant, the fact that the witness was not inter-
viewed represents a break down in the process, which the court was
unwilling or unable to fix' 4 9
2. State v. Toussaint
In State v. Toussaint,' the Law Court found that defense coun-
sel's "failure to take any effective measures to protect his client from
a potentially unduly suggestive photo-lineup identification is in-
defensible."' 5 Nevertheless, because the defendant "was not de-
prived of a substantial ground of defense" the court affirmed his
conviction for armed robbery.' Defense counsel failed to file a
motion to suppress the pre-trial photo identification and even failed
to voir dire the victim to "pursue the possibility that the photo-
lineup was unnecessarily suggestive.' 5 3 In conducting the photo-
lineup the police showed the victim five photos of "men of similar
appearance [and then informed] . . . her that she had chosen the
144. 490 A.2d 653 (Me. 1985).
145. Id. at 656.
146. Id. at 657.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 656.
149. In Kimball, the court held that the post-conviction court's finding of compe-
tence was not clearly erroneous. Id at 660. Whether the procedural posture of the
case really makes a difference in the court's standard is debatable. Also, the court
did not find clear error in the lower court's finding that it was "improbable that [the
witness's] testimony would have raised a reasonable doubt" with the jury. Id.
150. 464 A.2d 177 (Me. 1983).
151. Id. at 179.
152. Id. at 180.
153. Id. at 179.
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'right' man' 154 when she pointed out the defendant. Because the
court determined the photo-lineup to be reliable in fact, the in-court
identification was not tainted and the defendant was not
prejudiced.'55 Ironically, Toussaint's lawyer was disbarred as a re-
sult of his actions in the case but not for his incompetent perform-
ance.' 56 The court stripped him of his title of lawyer only after he
allowed Toussaint to lie on the stand.' 57 As merely a substandard
defense lawyer, Toussaint's lawyer could have stayed in business.
3. Vaughan v. State
Vaughan v. State 58 presents an interesting view into how the
Maine courts tolerate substandard representation of the indigent.
In Vaughan, the defendant was charged with possession of a firearm
by a felon, as well as drug trafficking. The trial judge and the State
suggested a stipulation to the existence of a prior felony conviction
for drug trafficking without revealing to the jury the nature of the
conviction. Defense counsel refused to stipulate, not because he
had a particular trial strategy in mind but because he did not under-
stand the implications of revealing to the jury that the man before
them on drug trafficking charges previously had been convicted of
drug trafficking.159 The post-conviction justice found that there was
no prejudice to the defendant because the court's intervention pre-
vented the jury from hearing about the nature of the prior convic-
tion and the Law Court held that this finding was not clearly
erroneous. While the result of the appeal can be fairly characterized
as correct, it is disturbing that the Law Court declined to discuss the
post-conviction court's conclusion that the "earlier failure to stipu-
late was a permissible tactical decision.' 160 Defense counsel's deci-
sion can hardly be characterized as tactical when counsel, by his own
admission, did not understand the pros and cons of the decision.
The Law Court's intentional silence on this issue is hard to accept.
What happened in Vaughan does not represent an easy mistake by
counsel or even poor judgment. Rather, it represents a lack of basic
154. Id. at 180.
155. Id.
156. Board of Overseers of the Bar v. Dineen, 481 A.2d 499 (Me. 1984).
157. Although Toussaint told Dineen that he had robbed the hotel, Dineen elic-
ited an alibi from Toussaint on direct examination in violation of Maine Bar Rule
3.7(b), which prevents a lawyer from presenting false evidence to a court. Id. at 501.
158. 634 A.2d 449 (Me. 1993).
159. On the second day of trial,
the proposed stipulation was again discussed, and defense counsel stated,
"I don't want to appear to be totally ignorant, but apparently I'm missing
something on this." Only after the court discussed in detail the implica-
tions of failing to stipulate to the felony conviction was counsel willing to
discuss stipulation with his client.




understanding of criminal law and, at best, the effects of woeful
inexperience.
Because of the trial court's admirable intervention in Vaughan,
one is pressed to point precisely to an instance of how the defendant
was prejudiced.' 6' One is left, however, with the nagging concern
that if defense counsel was so inadequate on this point, he was per-
haps inadequate on others that did not come before the post-convic-
tion court. But despite the fact that all attorneys are sworn in by the
courts and become officers of the courts, and despite the fact that
Maine courts appoint counsel to secure a defendant's constitutional
rights, the courts are reluctant to enter into an assessment of a trial
counsel's performance. The courts award trial counsel deference
and prefer to decide an ineffective assistance of counsel claim by
determining whether or not the defendant has proven prejudice.
The courts seem to prefer to keep the nagging concerns about de-
fense counsel's overall performance out of their decisions.
4. Levesque v. State
In Levesque v. State' 1 the Law Court reaffirmed its commitment
to a "substantially heightened deferential standard" when it re-
versed a post-conviction justice's finding of ineffective assistance of
counsel.' 63 The court also made clear that "substantial and over-
whelming" evidence presented by the state will excuse poor per-
formance by an attorney."6 Levesque was convicted of gross sexual
assault and misconduct. In what was essentially a swearing contest
between Levesque and his accuser, his daughter, his attorney failed
to attempt to impeach the daughter's credibility when he had the
chance. He also failed to call another daughter, who would have
contradicted the accusing daughter. 165
Justice Dana, joined by Justice Rudman, dissented and preferred
to defer to the post-conviction justice's determination:
Research has not produced a single case vithin the last thirty
years in which we have affirmed a Superior Court finding of
ineffective "trial" counsel and only once during that period
have we affirmed a finding of ineffective trial preparation.
The reason for this almost unblemished record is the amount
of ineffectiveness that we find acceptable. I do not quarrel
with the words-"ordinary, fallible attorney"-what needs to
be elevated, in my view, is our assessment of that attorney. 16
161. Even under Judge Robinson's test in Decoster, Vaughan's conviction would
have withstood a harmless error inquiry.
162. 664 A.2d 849 (Me. 1995).
163. Id. at 852.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 853.
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So rarely is ineffectiveness of counsel found by any judge, it is unfor-
tunate that the Law Court found it necessary to reverse the superior
court and thus deter judges from looking too carefully at a lawyer's
performance.
C. Federal Court Cases
1. Kimmelman v. Morrison
In Kimmelman v. Morrison,'67 Neil Morrison was charged with
the rape of a fifteen-year-old girl. His conviction was based on the
victim's testimony and evidence that was obtained without a war-
rant.168 At trial, in the middle of a detective's testimony, defense
counsel moved to exclude the evidence that had been obtained with-
out a warrant. 16 9 The motion was denied because it had not been
made within the time frame required by New Jersey rules. 170 De-
fense counsel claimed that he had only discovered the day before
the trial that the evidence had been obtained illegally.' 7 ' But it
quickly became clear that the only reason that defense counsel was
unaware of the facts was that he had not conducted any
discovery. 172
Ordering New Jersey to retry Morrison or set him free, the district
court referred to defense counsel's performance as "unmitigated
negligence.' 173 Although concurring with this finding, 74 the court
of appeals vacated the holding of the district court case for a deter-
mination of prejudice under Strickland.175 The Supreme Court af-
firmed the decision of the court of appeals. To prove prejudice,
Morrison needed to show that his unlitigated Fourth Amendment
claim was "meritorious and that there [was] a reasonable probability
that the verdict would have been different absent the excludable evi-
dence . .,,176
167. 477 U.S. 365 (1986).
168. Id. at 368.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 369.
171. Id.
172. The Court wrote:
Asked repeatedly by the trial court why he had not conducted any dis-
covery, respondent's attorney asserted that it was the State's obligation to
inform him of its case against his client, even though he made no request
for discovery. The judge rejected this assertion and stated: "I hate to say
it, but I have to say it, that you were remiss. I think this evidence was there
and available to you for examination and inquiry."
ld.
173. ld. at 372.
174. The court of appeals referred to defense counsel as "grossly ineffective." Id.
at 373.
175. The district court judge had used a harmless error standard because Strick-
land's standard had not been established yet. Id. at 372.
176. Id. at 375.
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Morrison finally prevailed on remand in Morrison v. Kim-
melman.' n The Government argued, as Justice Powell did in a Kim-
melman concurrence, that the evidence was reliable and failure to
attempt to suppress reliable evidence could not be prejudicial de-
spite the fact that the evidence was unconstitutionally obtained. 78
In his Kimmelman concurrence, Justice Powell said, "[Ilt would
shake that right [to effective assistance of counsel] loose from its
constitutional moorings to hold that the Sixth Amendment protects
criminal defendants against errors that merely deny those defend-
ants a windfall."' 7 9 The district court rejected this argument and
held that the failure to attempt to suppress unconstitutionally ob-
tained evidence was ineffective assistance of counsel.sO Morrison
was fortunate that the case against him was not very strong, and
virtually meritless without the illegally obtained evidence. If there
had been other evidence available and the court had found the in-
troduction of the evidence to be harmless error, Morrison's convic-
tion would have been affirmed and another incompetent attorney
would have gone his own way while his client went to jail.181
2. Mitchell v. Kemp
Mitchell v. Kemp"s represents another example of the courts' re-
fusal to relieve a person of the dire consequences of having a bad
lawyer. Billy Mitchell was sentenced to death for the murder of a
fourteen-year-old boy, Christopher Carr, during the robbery of a
177. 650 F. Supp. 801 (D.N.J. 1986) (writ of habeas corpus granted).
178. Id. at 802.
179. Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. at 397. The concurrence was joined by
Chief Justice Burger and Justice RehnquisL The windfall idea carried the day in
Lockhart v. Fretwel, 113 S. CL 838 (1993). See infra notes 215-22 and accompany-
ing text.
180. Morrison v. Kimmelman, 650 F. Supp. at 805. The court also denied the
government's request to obtain testimony from the trial judge to see if he would
have convicted Morrison absent the evidence.
181. In fact, Morrison did continue to suffer the effects of his attorney's incompe-
tence. Morrison was tried and convicted of rape of another 15-year-old girl. State v.
Morrison, 522 A.2d 473,474 (NJ. Super. CL App. Div. 1987). That rape took place
two months after the rape at issue in Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365 (1986),
in the back room of the seafood store operated by Morrison. State v. Morrison, 522
A.2d at 474. The same defense attorney Morrison had for the first rape charge filed
an untimely motion to suppress potential illegally obtained pantyhose. The motion
was denied. Id. at 475. Morrison then suffered at the hands of an appellate counsel
who did not raise the issue of ineffectiveness of counsel on direct appeal. On post-
conviction review, Morrison alleged ineffectiveness of appellate counsel. Id.
Although the court determined that both appellate and trial counsel were incompe-
tent under the first prong of Strickland, the court believed that Morrison had failed
to show that the outcome of the trial would have been different. Id. at 478.
182. 762 F.2d 886 (11th Cir. 1985), cert denied, 483 U.S. 1026 (1987) (Justice




convenience store. Carr's mother was wounded, her eyesight dam-
aged. Mitchell was arrested later in the day of the murder. He con-
fessed shortly after being taken into custody. He pled guilty and
was sentenced to death soon after.183
Mitchell's defense counsel "filed no pretrial motions"' 4 even
though the police officer who was present during the interrogation
and who signed Mitchell's waiver of his Miranda rights was Christo-
pher Carr's cousin. Counsel did not even interview Officer Carr,
because counsel did not like the man. 185 Counsel did not challenge
the confession even though Mitchell claimed that Officer Carr had
held a gun to his head "to extract the confession."'"8 6 Defense coun-
sel also failed to interview Mrs. Carr. He did not challenge her iden-
tification of the defendant even though her eyesight had been
damaged. Counsel did interview Mitchell on four or five occasions.
The district court sanctioned defense counsel's actions by stating
that "Miller [defense counsel] need only have investigated the case
to the point where he was familiar with the facts and the state's case.
He appears without a doubt to have done at least this much." 181
That a court would accept and endorse such a cursory approach to
the handling of a criminal case, not to mention a capital case, is ap-
palling. The district court justified its response by saying that Mitch-
ell failed to show what defense could have been utilized in his favor
had defense counsel done more.18 This justification ignores the fact
that the suppression of a coerced confession and the key witness's
identification and testimony would have left the Government with-
out a case.
The Eleventh Circuit's reasoning was equally specious when it
downplayed the consequences of defense counsel's inaction. The
court stated:
Whether or not the confessions were voluntary, Mitchell ad-
mitted in his guilty plea that he killed Christopher Carr. Even
if Mrs. Carr's identification should have been excluded be-
cause of the damage done to her eyesight by the wounds re-
ceived in the robbery, there was no ground for excluding her
testimony that the man who shot her son also shot her and
robbed the store. Mitchell shows no prejudice.189
The court's reasoning falls apart when one ponders the effects of the
suppression of Mitchell's confessions. If Mitchell's confessions were
183. Mitchell v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 1026, 1026 (1987).
184. Id. at 1027.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Mitchell v. Hopper, 538 F. Supp. 77, 98 (S.D. Ga. 1982), aff'd sub nom.
Mitchell v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 886 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1026 (1987).
188. Id.
189. Mitchell v. Kemp, 762 F.2d at 889.
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suppressed he would not have pled guilty.'"0 If he had not pled
guilty, he would not have admitted to the court to killing Carr. If he
had not admitted to killing Carr, there would be nothing to link him
to Mrs. Carr's statements that the same man who shot her son also
shot her.
Whether or not Mitchell committed the murder, Mitchell was en-
titled to a lawyer who would challenge the government's proof. The
United States Constitution, established to limit the power of govern-
ment, requires the state to convict a person properly. Without a
competent lawyer and with an approving judiciary the Sixth Amend-
ment right to effective assistance of counsel becomes no better than
an insult. 91
Defense counsel's failures took on even greater significance at the
sentencing phase of Mitchell's case. The State relied on Mitchell's
confessions and Mrs. Carr's testimony to establish the aggravating
circumstances that sent Mitchell to death row."9 Defense counsel
compounded his failure to challenge the reliability of the State's
proof when he "called no witnesses and presented no mitigating evi-
dence.' 193 According to defense counsel he failed to rebut the Gov-
ernment's proof because Mitchell did not want him to,"9 because
counsel's conversation with Mitchell's father had not been help-
ful,'9 because he thought there was nothing to find, and because he
thought that he could foreclose the government's entry of a prior
conviction in evidence by not "opening the door."' 96 One further
explanation defense counsel gave for his lack of preparation was his
incorrect belief that the State would not be able to introduce aggra-
vating circumstances because the State had not provided him winth
190. At least he would not have pled guilty in reaction to the Government's case
against him.
191. Ramsey Clark, in a lecture on the duty of loyalty to clients, said that -[a]
right that cannot be fulfilled is worse than no right: it can become an insult." Clark.
supra note 120, at 466.
192. Mitchell v. Kemp, 762 F.2d at 889. The aggravating circumstances proved by
the state were murder during the commission of armed robbery and aggravated
battery.
193. Mitchell v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 1026, 1026 (1987).
194. Id. at 1030.
195. It is not clear just why counsel called Mitchell's father. But it seems that he
was trying to withdraw from the case, not interview the man about his son. From the
record, Justice Marshall established that "[counsel apparently initiated these con-
tacts for the purpose of requesting that the family hire an attorney to relieve him of
his obligation to represent [Mitchell]." Id. at 1027. The Eleventh Circuit noted that
"[lthe father would not give definite answers on whether he was able to provide
funds for or aid in Mitchell's defense." Mitchell v. Kemp, 762 F.2d at 888. Defense
counsel had been appointed by the court. Id.
196. Mitchell v. Kemp, 762 F.2d at 889-90.
1996]
MAINE LAW REVIEW
written notice.' 97 The Eleventh Circuit approved defense counsel's
errors by labeling them "strategic choices.''a98
Defense counsel was flagrantly wrong when he thought he could
foreclose the use of the prior conviction. But just as was seen in
Vaughan, the court put a spin on counsel's actions by saying it was
reasonable to assume that "the presentation of good character evi-
dence might motivate the State" to introduce the prior convic-
tion. 99 The court ignores the fact that such an assumption, if it is to
be held reasonable, needs some basis in knowledge of which defense
counsel was not possessed.2"0 He did not even know the facts and
circumstances of the prior conviction, other than that it was a
felony.2 '
If defense counsel had taken some effort to go beyond his inter-
view with Mitchell, he could have created 170 pages of affidavits
from people willing to testify on Mitchell's behalf.2" He would
have found "family members, a city councilman, a former prosecu-
tor, a professional football player, a bank vice president, and several
teachers, coaches and friends. ' 20 3 Billy Mitchell was an above aver-
age student in high school; captain of his football team; an active
member of his student council, school choir, church choir, track
team; and a Boy Scout.2 0°  When he was sixteen years old, his par-
ents got divorced and he started getting into trouble. At eighteen,
he was arrested for armed robbery and, even though he maintained
his innocence, pled guilty because his father told him "things would
go easier for him. '' 20 5 The charges against the co-defendants were
dropped. While in jail, he was raped violently and repeatedly and
lost thirty pounds.2 6 All this compelling mitigating testimony was
lost for one reason and one reason only: Defense counsel for Billy
Mitchell failed in his duty to his client and in his duty to the system,
notwithstanding the appalling sanction by the courts of his wholly
197. Defense counsel supposedly believed written notice was necessary even
though the statute did not require it and no court decision had ever required it.
Mitchell v. Kemp, 483 U.S. at 1029.
198. Mitchell v. Kemp, 762 F.2d at 889-90.
199. Id. at 890.
200. Justice Marshall wrote, "If counsel in this case made any decisions at all,
they were barren of even minimal supporting information or knowledge." Mitchell
v. Kemp, 483 U.S. at 1030 (Marshall, J., dissenting). He also stated, "[A]n attorney's
decision to advance a defense that is wholly unfounded in law, combined with a
failure to investigate the merit of accepted and persuasive defenses, cannot be char-
acterized as 'sound trial strategy.' Indeed, such a decision is not strategic at all; it is
incompetent." Id. (citation omitted).
201. Id. at 1029.
202. Id. at 1027. That is the length of the record of affidavits compiled by Mitch-
ell's new counsel.
203. Id.





inadequate performance." 7 Billy Mitchell was executed on Septem-
ber 1, 1987, thirteen years after the death of Christopher Carr.20 8
3. Lockhart v. Fretwell
In Kimmelman a concurring Justice Powell verbally expressed
what the Court had said with its actions in Strickland. Joined by
Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist, Powell wrote that the
admission of illegally obtained evidence at trial should not consti-
tute prejudice under the second prong of the Strickland test." 9
Powell reasoned that because the Sixth Amendment only guaran-
teed the defendant a fair trial or a just result, and because a just
result could be achieved through the admission of reliable but ille-
gally obtained evidence, the defendant should not be granted re-
lief. 10 "[T]he harm suffered by respondent in this case is not the
denial of a fair and reliable adjudication of his guilt, but rather the
absence of a windfall."2'' Clearly, Justice Powell and those joining
him do not truly believe in the adversary system.212 In Kimmelman
the adversary system could have produced a different "truth" if the
illegally obtained evidence had been excluded. However, it would
be the "truth" that the properly operating adversary system pro-
duced and the "truth" that those who live by the system are sup-
posed to accept. Justice Powell cannot accept that the "truth"
produced by the system might be different from some other "truth"
that he believes is correct.213
207. Those who believe that Billy Mitchell was "actually guilty" may say he got
everything he deserved and not care about the result of this case. But anybody who
cares about the integrity of the system by which we convict and sentence people
should care that while Billy Mitchell may have received what he -deserved." he did
not receive what was his "right" to receive-effective assistance of counsel.
208. The day before he killed Carr he killed a man in Georgia. a crime for which
he received a life sentence. This, however, is irrelevant to the issue. Ken Sugar.
Regional News, UPI, Sept. 1, 1987, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Arcnews file.
209. Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 395-96 (1986) (Powell. J., concur-
ring). Justice Powell concurred in the result only because the question of whether
illegally seized but reliable evidence could constitute prejudice was not raised by the
parties. Id. at 391.
210. Id. at 396-97.
211. Id. at 396.
212. Or at least they are unwilling to live with some of the unpleasant conse-
quences that the system produces; the "actually guilty" may go free.
213. One commentator noted:
With some trepidation I should like to tender the suggestion that in ac-
tual practice the ascertainment of the truth is not necessarily the target of
the trial, that values other than truth frequently take precedence, and that,
indeed, courtroom truth is a unique species of the genus truth, and that it is
not necessarily congruent with objective or absolute truth, whatever that
may be.




Justice Powell's words and analysis carried the day in Lockhart v.
Fretwell,2 4 when Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, stated,
"To set aside a conviction or sentence solely because the outcome
would have been different but for counsel's error may grant the de-
fendant a windfall to which the law does not entitle him. '215 The
Court reversed the Eighth Circuit which had reversed a state im-
posed death sentence because defense counsel had failed to object
to the use of an aggravating factor, which duplicated an element of
the crime for which the defendant had been convicted.216 At the
time Fretwell was tried, such "double counting" was unconstitu-
tional in the Eighth Circuit under Collins v. Lockhart.217 The
Eighth Circuit therefore affirmed the decision to vacate Fretwell's
death sentence because it believed that the trial court would have
and should have followed the law of the circuit.21 8 The U.S.
Supreme Court, however, reversed the Eighth Circuit because the
Eighth Circuit had overruled Collins in Perry v. Lockhart,219 four
years after Fretwell's conviction. The Court refused to give Fretwell
what it considered the benefit of that window of four years; it "de-
prived him of the chance to have the state court make an error in his
favor."" 2 In this case, the Court perpetuated the fallacy that a "just
result" can be achieved when the adversary system breaks down. It
further damaged the right to effective assistance of counsel when it
said a "just result" can be achieved even if the outcome, but for
counsel's errors, would have been different.221
214. 113 S. Ct. 838 (1993).
215. Id. at 843. Justice O'Connor concurred but quickly pointed out that this
case represented an exception to the Strickland test of prejudice which was "whether
there is 'a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the
result of the proceeding would have been different.' " Id. at 845 (quoting Strickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984)).
216. Fretwell was convicted of committing murder in the course of a robbery.
That the murder was committed for pecuniary gain was proved to establish an aggra-
vating factor that allowed for the death sentence. This is called "double counting"
and was not permitted in the Eighth Circuit at the time that Fretwell was sentenced
to die. ld. at 841-42.
217. 754 F.2d 258 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1013 (1985).
218. Lockhart v. Fretwell, 113 S. Ct. at 842. Despite its decision in Perry v. Lock-
hart, 871 F.2d 1384 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 959 (1989), the Eighth Circuit
said that "it would only 'perpetuate the prejudice caused by the original sixth
amendment violation' to resentence . . . [Fretwell] under current law [(Perry)]."
Lockhart v. Fretwell, 113 S. Ct. at 842 (quoting Fretwell v. Lockhart, 946 F.2d 571,
578 (8th Cir. 1991)).
219. 871 F.2d 1384 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 959 (1989).
220. Lockhart v. Fretwell, 113 S. Ct. at 843 (quoting the Amicus Brief for the
United States).
221. Dissenting, Justice Stevens states, "Concerned that respondent Fretwell
would otherwise receive the 'windfall' of life imprisonment, the Court today reaches
the astonishing conclusion that deficient performance by counsel does not prejudice
a defendant even when it results in the erroneous imposition of a death sentence."
Id. at 846 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
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The Court in Fretwell seemed to limit further the right to effective
assistance of counsel when it stated that in theory an "unreliable
result" under the Strickland standard could be harmless error.
"Harmless error analysis is triggered only after the reviewing court
discovers that an error had been committed.... Since we find no
constitutional error, we need not, and do not, consider harmless-
ness."'  Even though Fretwell was a habeas case, it is possible that
the Court meant that harmlessness will be considered only on a di-
rect appeal. Only three months after Fretwell, in an opinion also
written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Court held that the Chap-
man standard of harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt does not
apply to habeas petitions.3 The Eighth Circuit dealt with the "ob-
lique intimation"' 4 in Fretwell by concluding:
[T]he prejudice inquiry necessary to determine whether a
criminal defendant has received constitutionally significant in-
effectiveness of counsel.., is analogous to the harmless-error
analysis applicable to trial errors in habeas cases .... Absent
more explicit direction from the Supreme Court, therefore, we
hold that it is unnecessary to add a separate layer of harmless-
error analysis ....
Whatever the Supreme Court meant in its footnote in Fretwell, that
the Court even considered adding a new and duplicative level of
inquiry is more evidence of the Court's intention to make it almost
impossible to obtain relief from the effects of incompetent counsel.
The state and federal court decisions discussed above leads one to
believe that the vice president of the Georgia Trial Lawyers' Associ-
ation was correct in his assessment of what constitutes adequate
counsel. If an attorney has a pulse and the government has a strong
case against the defendant, the courts will deny the defendant any
relief. -  Indeed, "[t]here are some indications that ineffective
assistance of counsel... requires the lowest level of compliance with
professional norms. (The Supreme Court has specifically said that
defense counsel are not required to adhere to the American Bar
Association's Standards for Criminal Justice, for example)." 7
Others believe that when the life and liberty of a client are at stake,
to do anything less than providing "the best defense in order to ob-
222. Id. at 842 n.2.
223. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 113 S. Ct. 1710, 1720-22 (1993).
224. Hill v. LockharL 28 F.3d 832,838 (8th Cir. 1994), cerL denied, 115 S. CI. 778
(1995).
225. Id. at 838-39.
226. One might think that defense counsel could sleep through the entire trial.
Fortunately this is not true. The Ninth Circuit found the performance of defense
counsel who slept through much of the trial per se ineffective and did not require a
showing of prejudice. Javor v. United States, 724 F.2d 831,833 (9th Cir. 1984). One
judge did dissent, believing that the defendant was not prejudiced by a sleeping at-
torney. Id. at 835 (Anderson, J., dissenting).
227. Feeney & Jackson, supra note 98, at 398.
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tain the best result for your client""2 8 is unforgivable. "If [defense
counsel] does less, he has not earned the title of lawyer because he
has failed to live up to the oath that he has taken."" 9 The courts,
however, forgive and even endorse poor performances and continue
to confer the title of lawyer on many who fail in their duties to their
clients, the courts, and the system.
V. A PORT IN A STORI: INEFFECrIVE ASSISTANCE DEFINED
OUTSIDE THE COURTS
Because the courts are unwilling or unable to provide the reme-
dies to the problem of inadequate assistance of counsel,
"[r]esponses are primarily required from the bodies that can supply
resources-the legislature and the bar.""2  Criminal defense attor-
neys must look to some other standards than those inadequately es-
tablished by the courts. As Professor Klein wrote:
In light of the difficulties for a defendant who was repre-
sented by an ineffective counsel in obtaining appellate relief, it
is crucial that substantial efforts be made to insure that coun-
sel act effectively and competently at the trial level. If review-
ing courts are going to presume competency, then the
profession must clearly indicate to counsel what indeed must
be done to provide competent representation. 231
Professor Klein was not satisfied with the attempts of the profession
to establish particularized standards. He felt that the Standards for
Criminal Justice were vague and largely unhelpful.232 But since Pro-
fessor Klein wrote his article, the ABA has revised the Standards.233
They contain many principles that, if followed and accompanied by
proper training, would ensure strong, effective representation for
criminal defendants.
Although the Supreme Court stated that defense counsel was not
constitutionally required to follow the ABA Standards for Criminal
Justice, it endorsed them as "guides" which reflected "prevailing
norms., 234 While the Standards obviously do not have the force of
law, they represent a high level of expectation for the practice of
criminal defense; they require far more than the bare minimum al-
lowed by the courts. Defense attorneys should strive to live up to
228. Cotsirilos, supra note 131, at 470.
229. Id.
230. United States v. Decoster, 624 F.2d 196, 217 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
231. Richard Klein, The Emperor Gideon Has No Clothes: The Empty Promise of
the Constitutional Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
625, 650 (1986) (footnote omitted).
232. Id. at 650-51.
233. See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 88.
234. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 668 (1984). "These standards are
intended to be used as a guide to professional conduct and performance." ABA
STANDARDS, supra note 88, Standard 4-1.1.
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the Standards rather than fall back on the bare minimum allowed in
the courts. Attorneys who rely on the latter should seek another
area of practice or another profession.
From the assumption that "[f]acts form the basis of effective rep-
resentation," 5 the ABA's Criminal Justice Standards Committee
wrote:
Defense counsel should conduct a prompt investigation of the
circumstances of the case and explore all avenues leading to
facts relevant to the merits of the case and the penalty in the
event of conviction. The investigation should include efforts
to secure information in the possession of the prosecution and
law enforcement authorities. The duty to investigate exists re-
gardless of the accused's admissions or statements to defense
counsel of the facts constituting guilt or the accused's stated de-
sire to plead guilty.
236
The duty to investigate is perhaps the most important duty a lawyer
has because without information the lawyer has nothing to argue. If
defense counsel for Decoster, Mitchell, Washington, and Kimball
had explored "all" avenues and proceeded without regard to coun-
sels' belief in the guilt of their clients, the adversary process would
have established a truly just result.
The duty to investigate, embodied in Standard 4-4.1(a) and its
commentary, confronts and rejects the contentions of the United
States Supreme Court and the Maine Law Court. The Strickland
Court stated that "choices [by counsel] made after less than com-
plete investigation" should be put to a test of reasonableness.' 3
Deferring heavily to the judgment of counsel, the Court said that
counsel could make decisions that other investigation is unneces-
sary.238 The Court further noted:
[W]hat investigation decisions are reasonable depends criti-
cally on such information [supplied by the defendant]. For ex-
ample, when the facts that support a certain potential line of
defense are generally known to counsel because of what the
defendant has said, the need for further investigation may be
considerably diminished or eliminated altogether.2 9
David Washington's lawyer became hopeless and effectively
dropped out. Billy Mitchell's lawyer relied almost entirely on infor-
mation obtained through his client. Believing his client guilty,
Decoster's lawyer refrained from conducting any investigation.
235. Id. Standard 4-4.1 commentary at 181.
236. Id. Standard 4-4.1(a) (emphasis added).
237. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 691. The Maine Law Court allowed
choices to be ruled by budgetary constraints. Kimball v. State, 490 A.2d 653, 657
(Me. 1985).
238. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 691.
239. Id. Washington's defense counsel was immobilized by a "hopeless feeling"
when Washington confessed. Id. at 672.
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While the actions of these three lawyers were sanctioned by the
courts, they violate Standard 4-4.1(a). The following commentary
to Standard 4-4.1 illustrates the ABA's rejection of the "standards"
of the courts:
In many criminal cases, the real issue is not whether the de-
fendant performed the act in question but whether the defend-
ant had the requisite intent and capacity. The accused may
not be aware of the significance of facts relevant to intent in
determining criminal responsibility. Similarly, a well-founded
basis for the suppression of evidence may lead to a disposition
favorable to the client. The basis for evaluation of these pos-
sibilities will be determined by the lawyer's factual investiga-
tion for which the accused's own conclusions are not a
substitute 2 40
The need for a lawyer to conduct an investigation separate from the
interviews of the client cannot be underestimated. The courts, how-
ever, do not hold defense attorneys to the same high standard of
performance as the Standards do.
Recurring throughout the Standards is the belief that defense
counsel's advocacy should not be affected by his belief or knowledge
that the client actually committed the act for which the client is
charged. Standard 4-7.6(b) states, "Defense counsel's belief or
knowledge that the witness is telling the truth does not preclude
cross-examination."2141 While the ABA recognizes there are times
when defense counsel should refrain from cross-examination, it
states that, especially when the defendant has admitted guilt to the
lawyer and when there is no defense to the crime, "to forgo vigorous
cross-examination of the prosecution's witnesses.., would violate
the clear duty of zealous representation that is owed the client.""42
This recurring theme in the Standards differs significantly from the
perspective the courts take on the issue. The Standards require a
lawyer to act adversarially even when to do so may suppress or even
confuse the "actual truth." The courts, however, forgive a lawyer
the dereliction of his duty to act as an adversary if they believe in
the defendant's "actual guilt." The ABA remains loyal to the idea
that "actual guilt" should not be considered in the adversary
process.2 43
Continuing on this theme are Standards 4-8.3(a) and (c) which
state, "Appellate counsel should not seek to withdraw from a case
solely on the basis of his or her own determination that the appeal
lacks merit... (c) If the client chooses to proceed with an appeal
against the advice of counsel, counsel should present the case, so
240. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 88, commentary at 182.
241. Id. Standard 4-7.6.
242. Id commentary at 225.
243. This, of course, is not entirely accurate. Prosecutors do have a duty not to
charge somebody that they "know" is "actually innocent." See id. Standard 3-3.9(a).
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long as such advocacy does not involve deception to the court." 2 "4
The ABA never forgets that the attorney is a servant of the client.
within the framework of the law. This does not mean the lawyer is a
mere puppet but that the lawyer must serve the client with the goal
of achieving the best results for the client. If the lawyer does not try
to achieve the best results, then that lawyer has not done his duty.
Yet another instance of the Standards' demand to defense counsel
to subjugate his interests and beliefs to those of the client appears in
Standard 4-8.6(c), which states, "If defense counsel concludes that
he or she did not provide effective assistance of counsel in an earlier
phase of the case, defense counsel should explain this conclusion to
the defendant and seek to withdraw from representation with an
explanation to the court of the reason therefor." 4 ' Vigorous repre-
sentation and avoidance of conflicts of interest demand that the law-
yer take such action.2" If defense counsel were to look to the
courts to determine when he was ineffective, defense counsel would
rarely be required to inform the client of his own incompetence;
looking to the Standards, defense counsel would be required to so
inform his client more often.
More than the courts, the ABA Standards adhere to the idea that,
above all else, "[t]he basic duty defense counsel owes to the admin-
istration of justice and as an officer of the court is to serve as the
accused's counselor and advocate with courage and devotion and to
render effective, quality representation. ' '247 The Standards demand
that justice be achieved only when every member of the "tripartite
entity' '24 does his job correctly. The courts, however, hold defense
counsel to his duty to the process only when the government or the
courts are unsure of a defendant's guilt.
The courts are not comfortable with the ABA method of repre-
sentation. In Morris v. Slappy,249 Chief Justice Burger, writing for
the majority, stated, "Over 75 years ago, Roscoe Pound condemned
American courts for ignoring 'substantive law and justice' and treat-
ing trials as sporting contests in which the 'inquiry is, Have the rules
of the game been carried out strictly?' A criminal trial is not a
'game,'. . . ."50 But it is a "game," a very real and serious one,
played on the assumption that only through a strict adherence to the
rules will justice be achieved. It is through the game that the system
244. Id. Standards 4-8.3(a), (c).
245. Id. Standard 4-8.6(c).
246. Id. commentary at 248.
247. Id. Standard 4-1.2(b).
248. Id. Standard 4-1.2(a). The prosecution, the judge (and jury), and defense
counsel are the three legs to the stool of justice.
249. 461 U.S. 1 (1983) (holding that a defendant does not have the right to a
meaningful relationship with his attorney).
250. Id. at 15 (quoting Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with
the Administration of Justice, 29 ABA ANN. REP. 395, 406 (1906)).
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trusts, the system will most often find "law and justice." Consider
Simon Rifkind's words:
I have also formulated the conclusion that the object of a trial
is not the ascertainment of truth but the resolution of a contro-
versy by the principled application of the rules of the game. In
a civilized society these rules should be designed to favor the
just resolution of controversy; and in a progressive society
they should change as the perception of justice evolves in re-,
sponse to greater ethical sophistication.' I
Paradoxically, the courts seek to preserve a system that inevitably
produces results with which they are uncomfortable. If the courts
cannot act in a manner consistent with the belief that justice occurs
through an adversary process, and if courts act as if justice can be
done when one third of the entity is incompetent, then the courts
are harming the system in ways more damaging than those that they
are trying to prevent.
VI. DRiFrING IN THE BREEZE: MAINE'S COURT
APPOINTMENT "SYSTEM"
There are three ways in which states provide indigent criminal de-
fendants with counsel: a public defender's office, an assigned coun-
sel system and a contract system. Except for the contract system in
Somerset County, 2 Maine employs exclusively an assigned counsel
251. Rifkind, supra note 213, at 527. Another commentator, Marvin Frankel,
wrote, "The 'adversary system'... is cherished as an ideal of constitutional propor-
tions, not only because it embodies the fundamental right to be heard, but because it
is thought (often) to be the best assurance of truth and sound results." MARVIN E.
FRANKEL, PARTISAN JusTicE 12 (1980). Yet another, Murray Schwartz, wrote, "In
part, [the protection of human dignity] signifies that persons on trial should not be
constrained in their efforts to avoid conviction: as previously stated, the full realiza-
tion of the self depends on the untrammeled freedom to challenge the power and
the resources of the state." Murray L. Schwartz, The Zeal of the Civil Advocate,
1983 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 543, 553.
252. The pilot contract system in Somerset County was started in 1991. Andrew
Bloom, The Right to Counsel in Hard Times, U. ME. SCH. L. INDEPENDENT WRIrINO
PROJECTS, 1993, at 53. By all accounts, the program saved the courts the time and
energy of looking for lawyers to accept appointments. Id. at 60-64. Sue Bushey, one
of the original Somerset County contractors, reports that the project continues to
work well. Telephone Interview with Sue Bushey, Attorney in Somerset County
Contract System (Apr. 4, 1996). She said that she believes that the "state still gets a
good benefit" in terms of administrative costs and she is "quite confused about why
they don't expand" the project to other counties, especially rural counties. Id.
Bushey believes that because the lawyers in the project provide a unified front to the
district attorney's office, they do well for their clients. IcL Unfortunately, the con-
tract includes only attorney's costs and fees and does not provide for investigative or
expert services. Id. Overall, the project seems to have been an improvement over
the previous ad hoc court appointment system that continues to exist in the rest of
the state. Concerns with contract systems in general include the fear that the state
will award the contract to the lowest and not necessarily the best bidder. Another
fear is that the contract lawyers, who do not practice criminal law exclusively, will be
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system; Maine has no state or county funded public defender's of-
fice. 53 Rule 44(a)(1) of the Maine Rules of Criminal Procedure re-
quires that "the court shall advise the defendant of the defendant's
right to counsel and assign counsel to represent the defendant at
every stage of the proceeding ...... In Cumberland County District
Court z attorneys are assigned by the clerks of the court from a
list, which is formally adhered to for the most part. In Cumberland
County Superior Court, attorneys are appointed, usually by the
clerk, if they are in the courthouse or if a defendant requests a par-
ticular attorney. If the case is very serious (for example, murder),
the judge will appoint an attorney who he thinks is qualified. 5 The
judge makes the formal appointment. To be eligible to accept court-
appointed work an attorney need only give his name to the court.
There is no application process.
A. Is Maine's "System" Constitutional?
Given the current test for ineffective assistance of counsel,
Maine's system would survive a constitutional challenge. Because
the courts make a determination of ineffectiveness on a case-by-case
basis, it is inherently difficult to challenge a system in the courts.
When constitutional challenges have been made, they have been
based generally on a lack of funding and the resulting problem of
excessive caseloads.5 6 At the present time, while "by any compara-
tive standard the Maine Court system seriously lacks staff, technol-
ogy, and funding," 7 Maine's system for indigent criminal defense is
not underfunded to the point where a court likely would find it un-
tempted to plead out the more difficult, lengthy, and expensive cases. Bushey said
that she does not believe that the latter happens because the contract lawyers are all
experienced, aggressive defense attorneys. d As for the former concern, there was
only one bidder last year.
253. Maine and North Dakota are the only states that do not use a public de-
fender program anywhere in the state. NATIONAL LEGAL AtD AND DEFENDER As-
SOCIATION, 1995/96 DMrECroRY (1995). Justice Department statistics show that
65% of all prosecutorial districts reported the presence of a public defender pro-
grain, either alone (28%) or in combination with another form of delivery system
(37%). BUREAU OF Jusr. STATS., supra note 11, at 2.
254. Because a public defender's office would be most practical in Maine's most
populous county, Cumberland, it will be used as the example for comparison to dis-
tricts with public defender systems.
255. The methods of appointment vary from county to county, courtroom to
courtroom, and judge to judge. Former Chief Judge of District Court Susan Calkins
(now a Superior Court Justice) said that "when she sat in District 13, a rural area,
she made all appointments herself, instead of relegating the task to a clerk as is often
done." Bloom, supra note 252, at 51-52. Then Chief Justice of the Maine Superior
Court, Thomas Delahanty, said that he assigns counsel as a sitting judge and encour-
ages lawyers to take cases as the Chief Justice. d
256. See infra notes 263-64 and accompanying text; see also Andrew Blum, De-
fense of Indigents: Crisis Spurs Lawsuits, NAT'L L.J., May 15, 1995, at Al.
257. 1994 STATE OF ME. JUD. BRANCH ANN. REP. 3.
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constitutional." 8 Of course, surviving a constitutional challenge is
not a badge of honor; the courts have constitutionalized
incompetence.
Even if Maine experienced such a shortfall that it could not pay
attorneys and attorneys refused to take cases, the negative effects of
inadequate funding in Maine would fall more on the "people" than
on defendants because the State could not proceed with prosecu-
tions." 9 Defendants would go free rather than be prosecuted. If
the State were to press lawyers into service or press indigents to trial
without effective appointment, a challenge could be successful be-
cause, traditionally, the need for individualized determination of
prejudice has been unnecessary where the government has inter-
fered with the right to counsel.2 6 If lawyers accepted the appoint-
ments without pay or with delayed pay and then provided shoddy
representation, challenges would require individualized, not sys-
temic, inquiries.
B. Is Maine's System Properly Funded?
Perhaps because inadequate funding is pervasive and easy to rec-
ognize,26' it is the main topic of concern in the literature regarding
258. According to the State of Maine Judicial Branch Annual Report for fiscal
year 1994, Maine had trouble paying the bills but the bills were paid-$4,305,462 to
be exact. Id. at 17. If attorneys had refused to work because the money was slow in
coming, there would have been a big problem. In 1991 attorneys in Washington and
*Hancock Counties began refusing to take cases for the reduced rate of $30 per hour.
Because the fees were not covering the attorneys' overhead, the small number of
attorneys doing court-appointed work were carrying the burden of budgetary
shortfalls. Justice Delayed is Justice Denied, MAINE SUNDAY TELEGRAM, June 2,
1991, at 6C; Bloom, supra note 252, at 3-4. Bloom's paper provides a good look at
Maine's attempts to keep costs low, including a project to screen non-indigents out
of the program.
259. The state could not simply dump the cases on a public defender's office be-
cause one does not exist. The state could ask attorneys to wait for their money, as
happened in the last part of fiscal year 1993. Court-appointed Lawyers in Bind,
PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, Feb. 14, 1994, at 2B. The state also could try to order all
attorneys to take criminal cases as the courts in Knoxville, Tennessee, did when they
ran out of money. Volunteers or Not, Tennessee Lawyers Help Poor, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 17, 1992, at B16. Alternatively, the state could ask all lawyers to take a case for
free. Such was the proposal of the Chief Justice of the Maine Supreme Judicial
Court, Daniel Wathen, who considered asking all attorneys in the state to take one
Class D criminal case on a pro bono basis. The proposal never got off the ground.
Bloom, supra note 252, at 69-70.
260. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 n.25 (1984).
261. Because budgets are clear and quantitative, solving funding problems is eas-
ier for judges than measuring and ruling on the quality of an entire system. When
funding is cut at the same time that caseloads increase, a court could conclude that
"'budgetary limitations adversely affect the actual delivery of effective legal services
to an accused person.'" Blum, supra note 256, at Al (quoting Kennedy v. Carlson,
No. MC92006860 (Hennepin County, Minn., Dist. Ct. Apr. 24, 1995)). Such was a
district court judge's conclusions when he ruled a Minnesota district public defender
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the indigent defense crisis.26 2 The impact of inadequate funding dif-
fers between court appointment systems and public defender
systems.
One effect of inadequate funding for public defender's offices is
an increase in caseloads.263 An enormous caseload can create a "re-
buttable presumption ... that indigents... are receiving assistance
of counsel not sufficiently effective to meet constitutionally required
standards."2' Such was the Louisiana Supreme Court's holding
when presented with a challenge from a public defender who be-
lieved that he was incapable of providing his clients with effective
representation.265 The attorney, Rick Tessier, had "represented 418
clients in the first seven months of 1991 and had 70 cases pending
trial .... .26 Then he was assigned to represent Leonard Peart, who
was charged with first-degree murder. "Before Mr. Peart's trial be-
gan, Mr. Tessier petitioned the trial court to find that he was provid-
ing ineffective assistance of counsel because of his caseload."267 The
judge granted his petition and remarked, "Not even a lawyer with
an 'S' on his chest could effectively handle this docket."'
In an assigned counsel system, the impact of inadequate funding is
harder to recognize and measure. 69 Because the immediate effect
financing statute unconstitutional. Id. The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the
district court and held that the chief public defender failed to show injury in fact.
Kennedy v. Carlson, Nos. CO-95-1282, C6-95-1559, 1996 WL 65766. at *1 (Minn.
Feb. 16, 1996).
262. If one reads the ABA's quarterly journal, Criminal Justice. in particular John
Arango's regular column entitled "Defense Services." one will see that inadequate
funding is a major concern among commentators and practitioners. See also Richard
Klein & Robert Spangenberg, The Indigent Defense Crisis. 1993 ABA SEC. CRI.t.
JUST. REP.
263.
The repeated reduction of funding to public defender programs around the
country threatens the very foundation of our system of justice-the Sixth
Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. The most devastating
effect of this chronic underfunding has been the creation of an ever-grow-
ing case-load per attorney.
Patrick Noaker, It Doesn't Come With the Territory, 10 CRIut. JusT.. Summer 1995.
at 14.
264. State v. Peart, 621 So. 2d 780, 791 (La. 1993); see also supra note 261.
265. State v. Peart, 621 So. 2d at 791.
266. Klein & Spangenberg, supra note 262, at 1.
267. John B. Arango, Defense Services for the Poor. CRIM. JUST., Winter 1994. at
46.
268. Klein, supra note 231, at 1.
269. One could argue that Maine should not adopt a public defender program
because it would not have a large political base of support. Because so many law-
yers are involved in the system now, there can be more pressure brought to bear an
the legislature to avoid funding cuts. In response, this Author suggests that lawyers
have little influence in the legislature---certainly no more than Chief Justice Wathen,
who was unable to prevent $500,000 from being cut from the budget in 1992. Actu-
ally, a public defender program can more readily assure proper funding than an
assigned counsel system because a challenge to a public defender system that has
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of inadequate funding is felt by the lawyers who get paid (or do not
get paid), the effect on the system depends on the reaction of the
bar. Will talented and experienced lawyers become frustrated and
disgusted and walk away from the system, leaving only inexperi-
enced lawyers who have few other sources of income? Will the bar
continue to accept cases and treat them in a cursory manner, prefer-
ring to spend more time on the cases that pay? Will the bar refuse
to accept cases and, in effect, shut the system down? In the more
populous counties, Maine's assigned counsel system avoids the
problem of excessive caseloads. For most attorneys, the system pro-
vides a supplement to their regular income. In some of the smaller
counties, however, where there are fewer attorneys, the problem of
underfunding and increasing caseloads is more apt to occur.27 °
The issue of funding is undoubtedly important. The so-called
"revolution" of 1994 continues to launch its "war on crime" by cut-
ting funding for Post-Conviction Defender Organizations. 271 States,
including Maine, are cutting their funds to the criminal defense pro-
grams.272 Funding, however, is not the end of the debate, funding is
a problem for all indigent criminal defense delivery systems.
Although proper funding goes a long way in producing quality rep-
resentation, it does not ensure competence by itself. The most im-
portant question is what type of system will best ensure the quality
of the representation for indigent criminal defendants?
had its funding cut has a better chance of success. When funding is cut and
caseloads exceed established limits in a public defender system, a presumption of
ineffectiveness can arise. See supra note 264 and accompanying text.
270. See supra note 258.
271. Marcia Coyle, Republicans Take Ain At Death Row Lawyers, NAT'L L.J.,
Sept. 18, 1995, at Al. Maine cuts its budget primarily by not increasing the hourly
rate paid to court-appointed attorneys. The $40 an hour rate has not changed since
1988. The other way is to have judges disapprove hours on the vouchers that court-
appointed counsel present to the judges for payment. The issue of Maine's un-
derfunding of the court-appointment will be discussed in part VIII.D.
272. In Wisconsin, the governor signed a budget that cut $22 million from the
state's public defender program. At the same time, caseloads were increased over
the ABA Standards and a contract system was created. Ceilings on fees paid in the
contract system caused experienced attorneys to stop doing indigent defense. Diane
Molvig, Public Defender Contracting: Financial Resources vs. Quality Legal Services,
68 Wis. LAW. 10 (Oct. 1995); Linda Barth, The Contract on Attorneys, 68 Wis. LAW.
28 (Apr. 1995). Maine cuts its budget primarily by not increasing the hourly rate
paid to court-appointed attorneys. See infra note 353 and accompanying text. The
other way it cuts its budget is by having judges disapprove hours on the vouchers
that court-appointed counsel present to the judges for payment. The issue of




VII. A NEW CAPTAIN AT THE HELM: A PUBLIC DEFENDER
PROGRAM IN MAINE?
In 1988 the subject of creating a public defender's office in Maine
was studied by the Judiciary Committee. 7 3 The committee found
that "a statewide public defender system is not justified by the facts
now available."' 74 Despite the title of the report, Study of the Fi-
nancial Feasibility of a Public Defender Program, and Issues in Im-
plementing a Cost Effective Program, the "major reason [that the
committee voted against a public defender office] did not turn out to
be financial."' 75 The committee believed the system's problems
with funding would be solved by an increase in appropriations. 276
There was inadequate information to determine what a public de-
fender office in Maine would cost.2 " Funding, fortunately and
properly, was not a determinative factor in deciding whether Maine
created a public defender program.278
Cost-effectiveness should not be a dispositive factor in determin-
ing the proper delivery system for indigent criminal defense.279
When Tennessee ran out of money for indigent defense in 1991, a
judicial decree ordered that all of Knoxville's lawyers be assigned to
cases, regardless of their abilities or experience.280 Such a "system"
273. MAINE LEoisLATURE, JOINT STANDING COMMrITEE ON JUDICIARY, STUDY
OF THE FINANCIAL F.Asm i.ry OF A PUBuC DEFENDER PROGRAM. AND ISSUFS IN
IMPLEMENTING A CosT EFFEcrrvE PROGRAM, 114th Leg., 1st Sess. (Nov. 1988)
[hereinafter JOINT STANDING COMM. ON JUDICIARY].
274. Id. at 14.
275. Id. at 21. The committee, however, was concerned with cost-effectiveness:
If, when the data is available, it appears that Maine's system is not operat-
ing in as cost-effective a manner as it has appeared to do in the past. the
Judiciary should consider the desirability of creating public defender offices
of limited jurisdiction in the larger urban areas of the State as a cost-reduc-
ing option.
Id. at 15.
276. Id. at 22.
277. Id.
278. Of course, cost-effectiveness still plays a part in the decision to continue
with the present system. Chief Justice Wathen "said he would not oppose (a public
defender program], but he is not a fan, primarily because the current system is
cheap." Bloom, supra note 252, at 68.
279. Marquette University Law School Dean Howard Eisenberg stated:
You have to go back to first principles . . . . The [state public defender
program] was established to provide effective representation to indigent
criminal defendants who have a constitutional right to counsel. It seems to
me if you start with that proposition, you arrive at different conclusions
than if you say, "How can we save as much money as possible."
Molvig, supra note 272, at 10.
280. Klein & Spangenberg, supra note 262, at 6. Knoxville's problems were
solved temporarily when the court granted a motion to suspend indigent representa-
tion until the office was restructured and representation was improved. The motion
was filed by the public defender. Noaker, supra note 263, at 18-19. In 1994, the
Tennessee Supreme Court issued a rule that created a commission that will prepare
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is certainly cost-effective but hardly professionally-effective, let
alone ethical.2 8'
The committee gave three reasons for rejecting a public defender
program: (1) a public defender office would not solve the problem
with appointments that occurred in the rural parts of the state, be-
cause a public defender office would not necessarily serve those ar-
eas, (2) adequate representation was not a problem with the current
system, and (3) there was very little support for the creation of a
public defender office from those in the system.2s
First, the committee reasoned that a public defender's office
would not solve the problem that exists in the rural parts of the
state.283 This is not necessarily true; the presence of a public de-
fender program could actually attract attorneys in the rural areas.284
In New Hampshire, the public defender's office handles all but four
percent of the cases in the state 85 New Hampshire courts are re-
lieved of the administrative duty of appointing attorneys except
when caseloads exceed the pre-established limits or when a conflict
of interest exists.8 6 The public defender's office handles the con-
tracting or appointing of attorneys in rural areas where it does not
have an office. There is no reason why a public defender in Maine
a plan to establish caseload limits, compensation for assigned counsel, and standards
for appointment. John B. Arango, Defense Services for the Poor, CRIM. JUST., Win-
ter 1995, at 46.
281. The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct state, "A lawyer shall pro-
vide competent representation to a client. Competent representation requires the
legal knowledge ... reasonably necessary for the representation." MODEL RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.1 (1983). Maine's Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility provides that a lawyer "shall not handle a legal matter which the lawyer
knows or should know that the lawyer is not competent to handle .... " ME. BAR R.
3.6(a)(1).
282. JOINT STANDING COMM. ON JUDICIARY, supra note 273, at 14. The commit-
tee stated:
The primary benefit of a public defender system would be the better qual-
ity legal services that it would provide to indigent criminal defendants. All
available evidence indicates that this is not a substantial problem under the
current court-assignment system. Although indigent defendants may not
receive the best quality representation in all cases, they certainly are re-
ceiving adequate representation.
283. Id.
284. If attorneys can be assured of payment and the proper support services, they
might be more likely to offer their services.
285. Interview with Michael Scibbie, Executive Director of the New Hampshire
Public Defender's Office, in Dover, N.H. (Jan. 19, 1995). The New Hampshire Pub-
lic Defender's Office is a publicly-funded private corporation.
286. The state assigns those four percent of cases that the Public Defender can-
not handle. In 1986, the Judicial Council decided to contract out the work instead of
assigning it on a case-by-case basis, because it felt that it would be cheaper. The
Council interviewed 85 applicants and selected 43 for contracts to handle the work
the Public Defender could not do. 1986 THE 21T BIENNIAL REP. OF THE JUDICIAL
COUNCIL OF THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE 3.
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could not do likewise in Maine's rural areas.287 The office simply
would take over the role of the state in assuring that services would
be provided in rural areas; offices in those areas would be unneces-
sary. The added benefits that a public defender's office would have
for lawyers in rural areas, even if the state retained control over
their compensation, include access to training through the office,
computer records and pleading forms, expertise, and a place to call
for assistance. These benefits were not discussed by the committee.
Second, the committee believed the current system provided ade-
quate representation to criminal defendants.2  Apparently, most
witnesses before the committee "agreed that the quality of ap-
pointed counsel did not differ appreciably from the quality of repre-
sentation provided in cases where a defendant retained his own
counsel.""ze 9 Testifying before the committee, one justice attributed
this to the fact that most attorneys who do retained criminal work
also take appointed work.290 Others, however, disputed this testi-
mony by pointing out that in the urban areas especially "a large por-
tion of the indigent defenses [sic] cases [are] assigned to attorneys
'just out of law school' ....291 The effect of new, inexperienced
attorneys on the quality of the system was downplayed by testimony
that "judges routinely search for more experienced attorneys to han-
dle cases where the indigent defendant is charged with a more seri-
ous crime, particularly in murder cases. ',2  This reasoning can be
accepted only if one believes that the quality of liberty should be
concerned with temporal considerations; that any jail time unjustly
spent is acceptable.
The committee accepted data from the Attorney General's office
as further evidence that the present system is adequate. The data
revealed that only two times in the three years prior to the report
(the three years after Strickland) had a defendant been granted re-
lief for receiving constitutionally defective assistance of counsel.293
The committee stated, "In light of the fact that the State has prose-
287. Maine's size should not make that much of a difference even though Maine
at 35,387 square miles is considerably larger than New Hampshire at 9351 square
miles. THm WORLD ALANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 664, 669 (1996).
288. JOINT STANDING COMM. ON JUDICIARY. supra note 273, at 2-3.
289. Id. at 2.
290. Id.
291. Id. at 2-3. From my conversations with people who work in the system, the
incidence of new lawyers in the system is growing. As jobs become harder to get,
more lawyers go out on their own and take assigned counsel work to help pay the
bills and build a practice.
292. Id. at 3. The committee went on to say that "[tlestimony was unanimous
that, regardless of their inherent abilities, appointed attorneys represented their cli-
ents in assigned cases just as zealously as they served their retained clients." Id.
Although such ethical behavior is admirable, it is little comfort to the defendant




cuted roughly 30,000 indigent individuals during that time, it is read-
ily apparent that indigent criminal defendants in Maine are
receiving an adequate defense." 94 Perhaps if the committee had
said "constitutionally adequate," one would have to accept its state-
ment as true. But as written, the statement is not true. The commit-
tee failed to recognize that "constitutionally adequate" and
"adequate" mean completely different things. Sadly, but truly, one
can receive "constitutionally adequate assistance" while not receiv-
ing "adequate assistance." The incidence of judicial relief was, and
remains, irrelevant to the determination of whether or not a system
provides quality, or even adequate, representation.295
The third reason the committee refused to recommend the crea-
tion of a public defender program was based on a surprising2 96 lack
of support from those involved in the system. The Committee
reported:
While the courts and prosecutors chose to adopt a publicly
neutral stance before the [sub]committee, it appeared that
they perceived no urgent need to depart radically from the
present structure. Very few attorneys who spoke with the sub-
committee endorsed a public defender system, and those who
did speak in its favor often did so guardedly. As a whole,
while several parties commented on the need for adjustments
to the present system, very few were ready to make a whole-
sale change to a public defender system.z 7
The committee justified its reliance on this sentiment as a factor in
its recommendation because it believed that the quality of represen-
tation depended more on the support the system received within the
state than on the system itself.2"' This justification should be re-
jected for two reasons: (1) the lack of support could be self-serving,
and (2) the committee was concerned with a lack of support for the
present system.
294. Id.
295. Without a doubt Maine has a very talented and dedicated criminal defense
bar, which is very generous with its time for new attorneys. Because of Maine's
small legal community, members of Maine's bar are very reluctant to criticize each
other. Defense attorneys are already a besieged group. But a conversation with
anyone who works in the system will reveal that the ability of Maine's court-ap-
pointed attorneys ranges widely from great to pathetic. What percentage of attor-
neys falls on each part of that spectrum is difficult to say. What is abundantly clear
is that there is no method for weeding out the bad attorneys. There is nobody to
make sure an attorney ever took a criminal procedure course or to tell an attorney
that he made a mistake in superior court and should go back to district court to get
more experience by accepting less complicated cases.
296. The committee was "surprised at the apparent lack of support .... JoINT





First, the lack of support could be self-serving.2' A change in the
current system to a public defender system would affect the attor-
neys who accept court appointments; there would be a great deal of
displacement. The present system now works as an equal opportu-
nity employer, leaving each attorney to make the best of the oppor-
tunity given him. A public defender program would create a single
entry program. Not everyone who wanted work would get it.300 If
this is the reason behind the lack of support, reliance on the lack of
support is not justified.30 1
Second, the committee's concern for support for change seems
even stranger given the fact that it later called for the judiciary to
encourage greater support and participation in the current sys-
tem. 30 2 The committee stated, "If participation in the system contin-
ues to carry with it deleterious effects upon a participating
attorney's private practice, we risk alienating these attorneys and
exhausting the bank of good will and ethical responsibility upon
which the system has for too long heavily drawn."' 3 The commit-
tee should not have rejected change based on a criteria that was not
satisfied by the current system. Nevertheless, decisions of necessity
should not be ruled by desire. A lack of a desire to change does not
mean that the need for change does not exist. Nor does it mean that
if a change occurred a new system would lack support from the peo-
ple who did not think the change should take place. The kind of
system matters more than the support that system has from the bar.
The level of bar support should not rule the decision.
299. The committee recognized this possibility when it lamented the absence of
indigent clients at the hearing and stated:
The committee acknowledged that the attorneys appearing before it were
experienced, hard working individuals with the goal of seeing that justice is
done. The committee notes, however, that these individuals would have a
financial conflict of interest in appearing before the committee to advocate
[for a] Public Defender System in that they would in some instances be
advocating a system that would take money out of their pockets.
Id at 23. There are, of course, attorneys, judges, and professors who believe in good
faith that a public defender program is unnecessary. This Author has great respect
for those with whom he has discussed the issue and does not wish to impugn the
character of those people by intimating that they are self-serving. The point is raised
only to show that the committee's focus was misdirected.
300. The New Hampshire Public Defender's Office has a very competitive appli-
cation process. They receive over a thousand applications a year. They have 75
regular attorneys. Interview with Michael Scibbie, supra note 285.
301. A public defender's office might harm the quality of the defense bar, or at
least reduce the number of qualified defense attorneys. Mr. Scibbie, Executive Di-
rector of New Hampshire's Public Defender's Office, is not convinced that New
Hampshire has as high a level of private bar involvement as it should. Notwith-
standing this, Maine should be concerned with achieving consistency in the quality
of the system and not so much with the size of a private defense bar. Id




There remains, however, the most important question of whether
the type of delivery system matters at all. The answer, according to
Floyd Feeney and Patrick Jackson, two law professors, is no, and
yes. On one hand they state no: "The best research to date indi-
cates that type of defense counsel-that is, whether defense counsel
is a public defender, an assigned private attorney, or retained pri-
vate counsel-is not an important determinant of case out-
comes." 3" On the other hand, they conclude that the crucial issue is
the quality of representation itself.3" 5 Their conclusion is that it is
possible to have quality representation in any system, or with any
lawyer. This is obvious but fails still to answer the question of what
kind of system, by design, is more likely to provide, and is more
capable of consistently providing, quality representation. While it
may not be crucial to the success of a trial whether defense counsel
is a private court-appointed attorney or a public defender, it is cru-
cial that the lawyer in any system be properly funded, trained, su-
pervised, and supported. What is the best way to ensure such
funding, training, supervision, and support?
VIII. THE GREEN BREAST OF A NEW WORLD: WHAT IS THE
"BEST" WAY?
3 0 6
The ABA Standards for Criminal Justice favor a "full-time de-
fender organization when population and caseload are sufficient to
support such an organization."307 Maine's population and caseload
could support a public defender program, just as every other state
besides North Dakota does. The ABA suggests a mixed system: a
public defender program as the primary delivery system that in-
volves the participation of the private bar.30" A public defender
program is preferred because:
304. Feeney & Jackson, supra note 98, at 407. One problem with the studies that
Feeney and Jackson analyzed is that they did not seem to consider the effect of
funding on the ability of a public defender or the assigned counsel to do their job.
They also make the mistake of measuring a system only by case outcome. One must
not forget that defendants deserve proper representation and not necessarily an ac-
quittal. Even great defense attorneys lose a majority of the time.
305. Id. at 413.
306.
And as the moon rose higher the inessential houses began to melt away
until gradually I became aware of the old island here that flowered once for
Dutch sailors' eyes-a fresh, green breast of the new world. Its vanished
trees . . . had once pandered in whispers to the last and greatest of all
human dreams; for a transitory enchanted moment man must have held his
breath in the presence of this continent ....
So we beat on, boats against the current ....
F. Scorr FITZGERALD, Tim GREAT GATSBY 159 (1953).
307. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROVIDINo DEFENSE SERviCES 3
Standard 5-1.2(a) (3d ed. 1992) [hereinafter ABA STANDARDS].
308. Id. Standard 5-1.2(b).
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By devoting all of their efforts to legal representation, de-
fender programs ordinarily are able to develop unusual exper-
tise in handling various kinds of criminal cases.... By virtue
of their experience, full-time defenders also are able to work
for changes in laws and procedures aimed at benefiting de-
fendants and the criminal justice system. 30 9
The flip side of this benefit is the possible development of an "insti-
tutional" product that discourages creativity and creates "burn-
out."
3 10
The Standards provide guidelines for the proper execution of a
particular system. Notwithstanding the obvious fact that there are
many highly qualified, talented, and dedicated attorneys working
within Maine's assigned counsel system, Maine's system must be as-
sessed in light of the fact that there is no assurance that every attor-
ney in the system is qualified.311 There are no real systemic checks
to protect defendants. The only check on competence is the judge,
who witnesses the lawyers in action.312 But a lawyer's dereliction
309. Id. Standard 5-1.2 commentary at 7.
310. Because public defenders see the same thing day in and day out it is conceiv-
able that they might fail to see cases as individual cases. Also, heavy caseloads make
it difficult to think too much about an individual case. Noaker, supra note 263, at 14.
16. In Maine defense counsel often knows more than the prosecutor about the case.
This is true, at least in Cumberland County District Court. because the prosecutor
does not see the file before the day on which the defendant appears for trial. The
fear is that a public defender would become like the prosecutor. looking at the file as
he shakes hands with the defendant for the first time. Usually this does not happen
in Maine.
Burn-out can occur for many reasons. Public defenders are not well received by
the public in general (and are often even resented by their own clients). They deal
every day with people, many who have done terrible things, who are caught up in
sad, tragic circumstances. They also are not paid as well as other attorneys. See
generally Charles J. Ogletree, Beyond Justifications: Seeking Motivations to Sustain
Public Defenders, 106 HARv. L. REv. 1239 (1993). As one practitioner in Maine
said to this Author, working in the criminal justice system is like -managing misery."
311. The fact is that the quality of all court-appointed counsel cannot be assured.
The only official stamp of approval court-appointed attorneys have are their law
school degrees and admission to the bar. There is no requirement that lawyers have
any experience or training in criminal law, beyond that required in law school. Eve-
rybody knows that first year Criminal Law is not sufficient training to practice crimi-
nal law anymore than Property is enough to allow somebody to practice real estate
law. As a small community, Maine criminal defense attorneys are reluctant to bad
mouth each other. But in my conversations with practitioners, it was clear that the
quality of court-appointed attorneys varies widely. One practitioner said to this Au-
thor that the system "doesn't protect against people [attorneys] who are stupid
enough or dishonest enough to not know that they are in over their head." While a
defendant could get the best lawyer in the state, he could also get the worst.
312. Judges, however, do not inquire into whether witnesses were contacted or
whether a proper investigation was done. Nor do judges inquire into whether
proper motions have been filed. This simply is not the proper role of the judge,
especially in Maine where judges are in short supply and short on time. The judge




before trial may not manifest itself in front of the judge. Even if it
does, by the time the judge witnesses a lawyer's performance, it is
really too late.313 Unfortunately, Maine's system fails to measure up
to the ABA Standards. This failure, although constitutional, should
not be taken lightly.
Maine's non-compliance with ABA Standards is nothing new. In
1974 a study was done to compare Maine's standards for criminal
justice against those of the ABA and the National Advisory Com-
mission on Criminal Justice (NAG). 31 4 Maine was not in compliance
with the NAC, which called for "community relations, office loca-
tions or police and community education." '315 Maine also did not
answer the call for a "formal plan [for the selection of attorneys or
for] ... a board of trustees to administer the plan ... to assure the
professional independence recommended by both the NAC and
ABA., 3 16 Nor was Maine in compliance with the requirement that
there be some "staff to monitor, assist or train assigned counsel. '31 7
Although Maine was in conformity concerning district attorneys,
Maine was not in conformity with the NAC or the ABA preference
for a public defender's office to confront the organization of the
313. The judge could call a mistrial, which is unlikely. The judge could also take
over defense counsel's job but that would mean the judge is stepping out of his role.
Moreover, judges are usually very busy, trying to clear their dockets, and do not
have the time to decide whether the lawyers are doing their jobs as well as they
should. Only the most egregious cases are likely to draw his attention. This Author
observed a rather unpleasant scene in superior court, while a justice was taking
pleas. The justice asked the defendant for a plea on a felony charge. The defendant
looked up at his attorney in confusion and was told his plea was guilty. The same
occurred on the second charge. Then the justice asked the defendant if he had had
sufficient time to discuss these pleas with his attorney to ensure that they were in his
best interest. The answer came, "No, not really your honor." The justice stopped
the proceeding and told defense counsel to take the defendant outside and talk it
over with him. To be fair, it is possible that the defendant played a role in not
making himself available to his attorney. These charges were, however, felonies and
involved jail time.
About an hour later, the attorney and the defendant were back in front of the
justice to begin again. This time, when the justice asked the attorney, "I assume you
have taken the time to go over the Rule 11 procedure with your client." Again, the
answer came, "No your honor. Could I have a minute?" The attorney and client
stepped aside for a moment while the court bided its time and tolerated the sad and
awkward display.
314. A COMPARATIVE STUDY: STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE OF THE
STATE OF MAINE WITH THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL Jus.
TICE AND THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION (1974). These standards are guiding
principles for whatever type of system that a state or county adopts.
315. Id. at 167.
316. Id. at 169.
317. Id. at 172. "There is no requirement that assigned counsel be experienced
or active in criminal practice. There is no staff available to assist the judge in select-
ing counsel or determining eligibility.... One consequence is a reportedly uneven
and sometimes inept level of representation." Id
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prosecution.318 In twenty-one years, not much has changed, Maine
continues to be out of compliance with the ABA Standards.
The ABA looks at four general principles against which a system
must be measured if it is to provide competent representation con-
sistently: (1) professional independence, (2) support services, (3)
training and professional judgment, and (4) funding.319 Against
these principles, Maine's system will be measured.
A. Professional Independence
Standard 5-1.3(a) states:
The legal representation plan for a jurisdiction should be
designed to guarantee the integrity of the relationship be-
tween lawyer and client.... The selection of lawyers for spe-
cific cases should not be made by the judiciary or elected
officials, but should be arranged for by the administrators of
the defender, assigned-counsel and contract-for-service
programs. 320
Appointed counsel should be as free as retained counsel from pres-
sure from the judiciary to act contrary to the best interest of a client.
A 1993 study by the National Institute for Justice showed that sixty-
three percent of the defense programs answered that increased
caseloads increased the number of plea bargains.32' Of that sixty-
three percent, eighty-four percent said that judges had placed some
degree of pressure on them to settle cases.' Of the same sixty-
three percent, eighty-six percent said that supervisory staff placed
no degree of pressure on attorneys to settle cases that otherwise
would not have been settled.323 It is not clear from these numbers
whether the presence of an organized public defender program al-
lowed attorneys to resist judges' pressure. 324 What is clear is that
judges were pressuring to some degree.' A system that uses
318. Id. at 174.
319. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 307, Standards 5-1.3 to 5-1.6.
320. Id. Standard 5-1.3(a).
321. J. THOMAS McEwEN & ELAINE NUGENT, NAT'L INST. OF JUSICE, SURVEY
REsULTS FOR PUBLIC DEFENDERS 3 (1993).
322. Id. Eighty-six percent said that the prosecutor was similarly pressured. Id.
323. Id.
324. While in the 1990 survey only two percent of the respondents were in a
jurisdiction that had only a court-appointed counsel system, such a figure is not
available for the 1993 survey. J. THOMAS McEWEN & E.AINE NUGENT, NAT'L INsr.
OF JUSTICE, SURVEY RESULTS FOR PUBUC DEFENDERS 1 (1990).
325. In Maine, indirect pressures on defendants to plead came from the amend-
ment to Rule 44(a)(1) of the Maine Rules of Criminal Procedure, which states that
people who are charged with a Class D crime would be assigned counsel only if a
prison sentence would be imposed. Before the amendment, Class D defendants
were appointed a lawyer. ME. R. CRIm. P. 44(a)(1) Supreme Judicial Court note to
1991 amend., Me. Rptr., 576-588 A.2d LXI. Chief Judge Calkins said that the
amendment was a "good idea, saving the state money, and making the process more
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honor, professionalism, and ethics as the only buffer between the
judge and the attorney, who relies on the court for appointments,
risks, at the very least, the appearance of undue influence.326
Although Cumberland County judges do not often appoint attor-
neys, the clerks of the court do. This practice violates the Standard.
Maine's system has no completely impartial administrator of ap-
pointments. Getting an appointment can depend largely on whether
or not the attorney is in the courtroom; for felonies, that system of
assignment is the rule.3 27 Because the ABA Committee felt so
strongly about keeping the judges and clerks out of the appointment
process, it deleted the word "normally" from the last sentence of
Standard 5-1.3(a). "The deletion emphasizes the notion that judges
and other court personnel should not select lawyers for specific
cases." 328  Independence ensures that the lawyer will not be
tempted to settle a case that he should not.
The problem in Maine is not that judicial pressure on the ap-
pointed bar exists or that attorneys succumb to it, but rather that
there is no systemic check to prevent it from happening. In New
Hampshire, the public defender does not depend on the court at all
for the assignment of cases.3 29 The public defender gets all indigent
cases unless there is a conflict of interest; a judge cannot refuse to
assign a case because he does not get along with a public defender as
can be done with individual attorneys. Neither does the public de-
fender office assign attorneys to a specific courtroom. Because of
this, attorneys do not practice before the same judge or prosecutor
every day and are not afraid to alienate a judge if they must.
Because Maine judges must approve payment to attorneys, ap-
pointed counsel are subject to another possible attack on their inde-
pendence.3 If the judge feels that some of the work performed by
the lawyer was unnecessary, the judge can cut the amount that the
lawyer will be paid.3 3 1 While it may be appropriate for a judge to
efficient, since defendants are more likely to enter a plea if they know they will not
go to jail." Bloom, supra note 252, at 12.
326. While the justice system could not operate without plea bargaining, judges
do not need to encourage it. Both the prosecutor and the defense attorney have a
sufficient interest in plea bargaining to ensure its continued practice. The indepen-
dence of the defense attorney may be jeopardized if he senses that a judge might not
appoint more cases to him if he does not "play ball."
327. Attorneys also can get appointments if people come to them in their offices
or if they have represented the defendant before.
328. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 307, Standard 5-1.3 commentary at 14.
329. Interview with Michael Scibbie, supra note 285.
330. One must ask, "Why are judges responsible for approving payment any-
way?" It should not be merely because court appointment funds are part of the
judicial budget.
331. See ME. R. CRIM. P. 44(a)(1); Fee Schedules for Court-Appointed Counsel
in the Superior and District Courts, Nos. SJC-318, SJC-406, at 3 (Me. July 1, 1991).
As it is, defense attorneys do not get paid regularly by the state. Traditionally, when
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rule on the failure of counsel to file a particular motion, it is inap-
propriate for a judge to control counsel's actions through the power
of the purse. When an attorney has his hours disapproved on the
payment voucher he presents to the judge, he is left with numerous
inevitable questions: "Which half hour should I have not talked to
my client? Which motions should I have not researched, written,
and filed? Which constitutional rights should I have not sought to
protect? Which leads should I have summarily ignored?" The chil-
ling effect of the judge's disapproval of hours cannot be underesti-
mated. In Maine, an indigent defendant can be assured that there
will be more oversight of his lawyer's bill to the state than of his
lawyer's performance.
New Hampshire insulates the public defender from such judicial
interference and avoids the embarrassing conclusion above because
the state pays the money in a lump sum. 332 The program can make
day-to-day decisions to provide quality representation without hav-
ing to justify each expense. Public defenders do not have to petition
the state for more money if a particular case will take a lot of time,
as Maine attorneys do if the case hours are likely to exceed the limit
for that class of crime.333
B. Support Services
Standard 5-1.4 states: "The legal representation plan should pro-
vide for investigatory, expert, and other services necessary to quality
legal representation. These should include not only those services
and facilities needed for an effective defense at trial but also those
that are required for effective defense participation in every phase
of the process." 3 4 In Maine and New Hampshire attorneys must
petition the court for money to pay experts. It is difficult in Maine
to get an expert to work for court-determined fee amounts, often
because the expert would be coming from out of state. If defense
counsel cannot get an expert to appear for the amount the judge will
approve, the judge may rule that the expert is not needed. In Maine
no defense attorney wants to rely on the State's experts for a psy-
chological evaluation because the State's experts almost always find
June arrives, money has run out and defense counsel must wait for the next fiscal
year for their money. Such a tardy and disruptive pay schedule has caused many
good attorneys to stop taking court-appointed cases.
332. The appropriation for the public defender for 1996 is S7.5 million, for 1997
$7.9 million. 1995 N.H. Laws 307. The starting salary for public defenders is
$29,360. Institutional Brochure from New Hampshire Public Defender 4 (Aug.
1995).
333. Fee Schedules for Court-Appointed Counsel in the Superior and District
Courts, Nos. SJC-318, SJC-406, at 2. The maximum fees set by the Maine Supreme
Judicial Court are as follows: Class A, $2,000; Classes B and C (against person),
$1,500; Classes B and C (against property), $1,000; Classes D and E, $500. Id.
334. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 307, Standard 5-1.4.
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the defendant sane. In New Hampshire the same problem is not
reported. Nevertheless, the Executive Director of the New Hamp-
shire program said that he dislikes requesting funding from a judge
because there is a risk of tipping the defense's hand too early, and
because the judge may not approve of the use of an expert in a cer-
tain context.335
The major difference between the support services of Maine and
New Hampshire appears in the area of investigators. In Maine
court-appointed counsel must petition the court for funds for an in-
vestigator.336 If attorneys need more money, they must re-petition.
The money available for investigators is limited.3 37 In Kimball, the
court accepted defense counsel's limited budget for investigation as
a natural consequence of a court appointment.338 Because investi-
gation is essential to a proper discovery of the facts of a case, and,
subsequently, to quality representation, insufficient funds for inves-
tigators create a severe impediment to effective assistance of coun-
sel. The attorney, who usually is paid more per hour than an
assistant is paid, should not fill this gap in the pretrial information
gathering process. The comment to ABA Standard 5-1.4 states that
"when an attorney personally interviews witnesses, the attorney may
be placed in the untenable position of either taking the stand to
challenge the witnesses' credibility if their testimony conflicts with
statements previously given or withdrawing from the case." 339 Reli-
ance on a budget-constrained court for yet another essential part of
quality representation further undermines confidence in Maine's
present system.3 0
C. Training and Professional Development
A law school education prepares attorneys for everything and
nothing. Although the bar assumes otherwise, an attorney just out
335. Interview with Michael Scibbie, supra note 285.
336. Fee Schedule for Court-Appointed Counsel in the Superior and District
Courts, Nos. SJC-318, SJC-406, at 2.
337. The expenditures for investigators in indigent defense cases did increase
from $79,688 in fiscal year 1993 to $114,405 in fiscal year 1994. 1994 STATE OF ME.
JUD. BRANCH ANN. REP. 17. The courts' budget problems and the resulting carry-
over of debts from one year to the next make the size of the increase deceiving.
According to one practitioner, his average case requires about $500 for an investiga-
tor, more for a sex assault case. The hourly pay for an investigator on a court-
appointed case ends up being about $25 an hour. The practitioner said that the low
pay means that the investigators are either new or doing the work as a professional
courtesy.
338. Kimball v. State, 490 A.2d 653, 657 (Me. 1985).
339. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 307, Standard 5-1.4 commentary at 22.
340. By contrast, in New Hampshire, there is one investigator for every three
attorneys. Interview with Michael Scibbie, supra note 285. The investigators work
full-time for the Public Defender; there is no need to petition for funds from a court
that is constrained by budgetary concerns. Id.
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of law school usually does not have the knowledge to practice law
effectively on his own without the benefit of some support sys-
tem"' 1 In law firms, new associates can turn to partners for advice
and assistance. When new attorneys are on their own, they can turn
only to the bar in general to seek advice from experienced attorneys
who have a moment to spare. That is how it works in Maine. New
attorneys seek and get help from the veteran defense bar. The
clerks are also helpful at first.3 2 The veterans will look over the
new attorney's shoulder to see what type of case he has and wil
offer a bit of advice and a word of encouragement. Such is the ex-
tent of Maine's post-graduate training for criminal defense attorneys
who perform assigned-counsel work as solo practitioners.13
There has been an effort on the part of the defense bar to organ-
ize and improve the quality of representation. In 1991, five attor-
neys incorporated the Maine Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers (MACDL). MACDL publishes a quarterly newsletter enti-
tled Maine Defender and organizes seminars and Continuing Legal
Education Programs on issues relevant to criminal defense work.
MACDL also is considering the creation of an advisory committee
to the Maine Supreme Judicial Court on indigent defense issues,
which was recommended in 1989 by a commission of the Maine
State Bar Association. 3 " The creation and growth of MACDL is a
341. Certainly, some new attorneys are qualified to be on their own and are very
good. But even those attorneys seek out help from the rest of the bar, which gener-
ously provides assistance.
342. During this Author's first jury trial as a student defense attorney, everyone
in the court, except the prosecutor of course, was very helpful. At one point during
jury selection, the attorneys gathered at the bench to make challenges for cause after
the judge had asked the questions to the jury pool. Unaware that this was the pur-
pose of the "sidebar," this Author left his jury selection worksheet at the defense
table. Noticing this, the clerk placed her sheet on the bench rail and nudged it his
way. This Author glanced down and made his challenge for cause which was denied.
The denial for the specific challenge was not a surprise because the judge earlier had
denied a blanket challenge for the same reason. Nevertheless, after a while attor-
neys are on their own and should not expect to be saved by the clerks.
343. In the Judiciary Committee's report, the committee recognized the impor-
tance of defense attorneys staying current with the technological advances in crimi-
nal investigation. The committee also observed that while the District Attorney's
office and the Attorney General's office can send its attorneys to seminars, private
practitioners do not generally have the funds or the time to attend seminars to assist
them with their professional development. See JoINT STNDNo COMi. OrN JD ci-
ARY, supra note 273, at 19-20. Continuing Legal Education programs are usually
one day out of a year, such programs also do not offer a new attorney the same type
of individualized training that should be available. This Author was told by a practi-
tioner that defense attorneys would volunteer their time to train new attorneys.
They also would be willing to work with apprentices, who would second-seat on a
trial, as is the practice with murder cases. The same practitioner said that attorneys
are too busy and are not unified enough to organize such training.
344. REPORT oF THE MANE STATE BAR AssOctArON's CoM.MISIoN To EvAL-
UATE MAINE'S COURT APPOINTMENT SYSTFM 7 (1989).
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promising sign that the defense bar is unifying and soon will be able
to elicit needed improvements in the way that Maine provides indi-
gent criminal defense.
Maine's approach to professional training and development, how-
ever, does not comply with the ABA Standard for Criminal Justice
5-1.5, which states: "The legal representation plan should provide
for the effective training, professional development and continuing
education of all counsel and staff involved in providing defense serv-
ices. Continuing education programs should be available, and pub-
lic funds should be provided to enable all counsel and staff to attend
such programs. '345 New Hampshire, on the other hand, provides
initial, structured training to its new attorneys, as well as continuing
education for its veterans. New Hampshire hires new public defend-
ers from a large pool of applicants; the hiring process is very com-
petitive. New attorneys participate in a five-week training program,
in which they do writing exercises, practice interviewing clients, dis-
cuss ethics, run through mock trial situations, 346 observe senior at-
torneys demonstrating techniques, and talk with investigators. 47 At
their first trial, they are accompanied by a senior attorney.
Throughout their first year, they participate in on-going training on
Saturdays. Perhaps most importantly, they have the benefit of a law
firm atmosphere; they practice in the same office with experienced
attorneys from whom they can seek assistance. While one might ar-
gue that a public defender office training program creates a same-
ness that stifles creativity, it cannot be questioned that a training
program will ensure a higher level of performance at the beginning
of a new attorney's career and thus a better base from which to de-
velop professionally. 348
D. Funding
ABA Standard 5-1.6 states: "Government has the responsibility
to fund the full cost of quality legal representation for all eligible
persons .... It is the responsibility of the organized bar to be vigi-
lant in supporting the provision of such funding." 9 Maine's court
appointment system is underfunded. Most who look at the system
recognize this fact. In 1995, the average cost per voucher presented
to the State for payment for work done in the district court was
345. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 307, Standard 5-1.5.
346. The new attorneys are videotaped so that they may learn from watching and
listening to themselves.
347. Interview with Michael Scibbie, supra note 285.
348. Whether an attorney becomes staid is a matter of personal and professional
character.
349. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 307, Standard 5-1.6.
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$165,350 less than the average tune-up. For work in superior court,
the average cost per voucher was $425,31 less than the average new
transmission. Maine is getting an exceptionally good deal.
The rate of $40 an hour has not changed since 1987, even though
compensation for judges and prosecutors has risen.351 Dennis Ma-
har, the current Maine State Bar Association President, points out
that $40 does not even cover overhead coStS.3 5 3 Mahar states:
The State of Maine has been the beneficiary of an incredible
bargain in court-appointed attorneys. It is the least expensive
system in the country .... Studies by our Indigent Defense
Committee conclude that no other model, such as public de-
fenders, could do a better job for less or even equal cost. The
solution is more money.354
To add insult to injury, Maine's criminal defense attorneys are not
getting paid even for the hours they work. If they present a voucher
for twenty hours of work at forty dollars an hour, they are very
likely to be paid for fifteen or fewer of those hours. The process of
cutting fees is a sign either of judges working under budgetary con-
straints or of a disrespect for the professional judgments of defense
counsel. If the latter were the case, it indeed would be ironic if one
remembers that judges are loath to pass judgment on defense coun-
sel's decisions during a trial. Either way, the process is a signal that
something is very wrong in the system. Judges should not be ap-
proving or disapproving of the hours a defense lawyer spends on his
case.355 The chilling effects on representation are inevitable and un-
350. The State of Maine Administrative Office of the Courts, Summary Table:
Court-Appointed Counsel Expenditures (a): FY '86-FY '95 (unpublished report on
file with the State of Maine Administrative Office of the Courts).
351. Id
352. Dennis L. Mahar, The President's Page, Mn. B.J., Jan. 1996, at 5. In 1937
Law Court justices, superior court justices, and district court judges were paid
$58,760, $57,841, and $55,659 respectively. Id. Currently, they are paid $80,392,
$76,024, and $72,983 respectively. Id. Nobody would argue that the judges do not
deserve the increases. The increases merely point out that while other areas of the
judicial branch have received the appropriate attention and recognition for jobs well
done the court appointment system has been ignored.
353. Id. Information for 1989 from the State of Maine Administrative Office of
the Courts showed that on average lawyers were not even paid $40 an hour. The
average cost per hour was $32.13. The State of Maine Administrative Office of the
Courts, Indigent Defense Expenses by Type of Case. Fiscal Year 1989 (unpublished
report, on file with the State of Maine Administrative Office of the Courts).
354. Mahar, supra note 352, at 5.
355. In 1989, the Deputy Chief Counsel of the Massachusetts Committee for
Public Counsel Services wrote:
Typical confrontations between the courts and assigned counsel pro-
grams involve the authority to assign or remove attorneys and to approve
or disapprove payment of attorneys' bills .... A perhaps apocryphal ex-
change illustrates the advantages of an independently administered pro-
gram. Following her aggressive and vigorous representation of a client, an
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deniable. Maine defense lawyers, who are committed to and capa-
ble of providing quality representation to their clients, should not be
treated as they are when it comes to paying them a reasonable wage.
Funding, however, is not everything. This Author cannot agree
with Mr. Mahar when he says, "The solution is more money." With-
out more, money will not ensure quality representation. Because all
the lawyers should get paid what they deserve, it does not follow
that all lawyers deserve to get paid. In 1986 a Maine State Bar As-
sociation commission evaluated the court appointment system.356
The commission stated, "The 'quality' of legal services rendered by
Maine's attorneys to indigent defendants is a subjective characteris-
tic, difficult to define and which the Commission made no serious
effort to study.... The Commission finds no cause for complaint
with the quality of legal services rendered to indigent persons. 35 7
Finding "no cause for complaint" without a serious effort to study
the issue does not amount to much. Maine is left with the problem
that there are, in company with all the talented and dedicated de-
fense lawyers, lawyers appointed by the court who probably should
not be practicing criminal law. Maine needs to do more than throw
money at the problem to ensure proper and consistent representa-
tion. Even if Maine does not create a public defender program, if it
had a structured program that provided for independent systematic
assignment,358 an application process adopting qualification stan-
dards,359 and professional training, Maine would have a system that
comes closer to ensuring consistent, quality representation.
IX. CONCLUSION
"Our system of justice is a reflection of our societal development,
and the furnishing of adequate defense services a measure of our
justice system. '' 360 Sadly, the failure to provide adequate defense
services has marked a societal regression, or perhaps more accu-
rately, a societal reluctance to develop. Popular television court-
room dramas, such as Perry Mason and Matlock, illustrate that
American audiences cling to the idea that only the innocent are wor-
thy of being defended. None of those famous lawyers' clients ever
assigned attorney was told at sidebar by the judge that he not only would
not appoint her again, he would not pay her for the case at hand. Because
of the structure of the system, the attorney was able to say, "It doesn't
work that way any more, Your Honor."
Nancy Gist, Assigned Counsel. Is the Representation Effective, CrIM. JUST., Summer
1989, at 17, 46.
356. Report of the Maine State Bar Association's Commission to Evaluate
Maine's Court Appointment System (1986).
357. Id at 2.
358. See, e.g., ABA STANDARDS, supra note 307, Standard 5-2.1.
359. See, e.g., id. Standard 5-2.2.
360. Id. Standard 5-1.6 commentary at 26.
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did it. If criminal defense lawyers charged a dollar to every person
who asked, "How can you defend somebody you know is guilty?"
the funding crisis would end!36' Against this attitude stands the
lonely belief3 62 that all people are entitled to a lawyer who will work
competently to achieve the best results for all of his clients.
Unfortunately, the U.S. Supreme Court appears to side with those
who watch Perry Mason. The Court accepts a guilty verdict as a fair
and reliable result even when the defense lawyer performs shame-
fully. Through its decisions, the Court says that the Constitution
does not entitle all people to a lawyer who will work for the client's
best interests. Through the creation of the Strickland test, in effect
the Court says that defendants are only entitled to a zealous and
competent advocate when the Court has doubts about the defend-
ant's "actual guilt." If the Strickland test does not misapprehend
what effective lawyers do, it certainly does not appreciate what they
do. As Michael Scibbie of the New Hampshire Public Defender
Program says, "Effective lawyers do more than bring out factoids to
throw into the bowl to see who gets more., 363 When weighing the
state's inculpatory evidence against the defendant's exculpatory evi-
dence, the courts do not concern themselves with the fact that the
scales of justice are not properly calibrated when defense counsel is
incompetent.
Because the Constitution, as interpreted by the Supreme Court,
says that incompetent counsel may be constitutionally acceptable,
the argument for a public defender program-or at least a more
structured court appointment system-must look beyond the bare
361. Simon Rifkind wrote:
"How could you represent so-and-so?" is a question frequently put to
me, sometimes by grey-haired ladies in sneakers and sometimes, more pas-
sionately, by campus revolutionaries. The tone of the voice which accom-
panies the question sufficiently discloses the questioner has consigned the
client to some subhuman category of untouchables.
If only the lay public understood that if the outcasts, the rejected ones,
the deviationists, the unpopular ones are to be unrepresented, the adver-
sary system would fail for everyone. If they comprehended how the engine
of the adversary process is ignited and works, they would never ask to ex-
plain why a lawyer did take a particular case, but rather why he had re-
jected another. That, indeed calls for justification.
Recently a group of law students picketed a prominent Washington law-
yer in order to give expression to their disapproval of his representation of
a large corporation.
Rifkind, supra note 213, at 518-19. Rifkind's inclusion of a story about law students
reminds one that the legal community is not immune from the lack of understanding
Rifkind discusses.
362. "The legal profession and the judiciary and those who should be most con-
cerned about safeguarding the integrity and fairness of the system are too often
silent." Bright, supra note 17, at 483.
363. Interview with Michael Scibbie, supra note 285.
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minimum required by the Constitution. One must look to policy
considerations, the traditional American distrust of the power of the
state, and the fact that proper criminal representation ensures that
the system will work as it was originally intended.
A public defender program would ensure that the government's
power to deprive people of their liberty would be appropriately
checked. Essential to being a member of American society is a
healthy distrust of the power of the state. Part of being a person in
the United States means that one can challenge the government's
power to take away one's liberty and life. When a person is denied
the opportunity to challenge effectively the government's power,
that person is denied some of what it means to be a person in our
society.3" This threat to "personhood" should concern all people
interested in preserving the values on which the country was
founded. Howard Dana, Director of Legal Service Corp., said,
"Anyone who values this society, values our fundamental liberties,
has a stake in making sure that justice is available to everyone. ''365
Maine's court appointment system does not ensure its people the
ability to challenge effectively the power of the state.
This threat to "personhood" is especially egregious because it falls
to one segment of society, the poor.3 66 The indigent face a greater
obstacle to obtaining adequate representation than those with the
means to employ counsel.367 Judge Bazelon said:
The "street crime" that clogs our courts is bred by poverty and
discrimination. It is committed by the dispossessed, the disad-
vantaged and the alienated of our society-those who most
need the advice of a trained advocate.... [T]he cruel irony, of
course, is that the indigent are the very people who are least
able to obtain competent representation. C
Because we live in a capitalist society, we must accept some differ-
ences in the ability and cost of lawyers; not everybody can afford
Johnnie Cochran. What we should not accept is a system that per-
364. Obviously, committing a criminal act cannot strip a person of the right to
challenge the government. If it did, the right to challenge the state's power would be
an empty right, available for only those who do not need it, just as the freedom to
speak one's mind would be an empty right if it were available only to those people
who nobody wished to silence.
365. NEw DIMENSIONS FOR JUSTICE: COMMISSION TO STUDY THE FUTURE OF
MAINE'S COURTS 33 (1993) [hereinafter NEw DIMENSIONS FOR JUSTICE].
366. "It is those who are the least among us-the poor, the members of minori-
ties and the despised-that most need the protection of the Bill of Rights." Bright,
supra note 17, at 483.
367. When one is paying for a lawyer, one can shop around. Indigent defendants
cannot shop. Although they may request a particular lawyer, they are not assured of
the lawyer of their choice.




mits more than a disparity of talent. The system existing in Maine
today permits complete incompetence.
Maine's present system poses a great threat to the ability to chal-
lenge the State because not only does it deny relief to those who
suffer at the hands of inadequate counsel, but it also denies those in
the system adequate assurance that their lawyer is competent.
Maine has no application process, no eligibility requirements, no
training for new attorneys, no mandatory vehicle for continuing ed-
ucation, no administrator to ensure professional independence, and
no other checks on the attorneys that it appoints to represent the
poor. Shamefully, in Maine, a criminal defendant can be assured
that the State and the people of the State are more concerned with
the cost of his defense than the quality of it.
While Maine should develop a public defender program, if it does
not, it should at least establish a more structured system. There
should be standards to determine eligibility to serve. 369 Maine's sys-
tem should provide training for new attorneys. Judges and clerks
should not appoint attorneys. Appointments should not depend on
the attorney's mere presence in the courtroom. The budget for
Maine's system should not be included in the budget of the judicial
branch; there should be a separate administrator that oversees a
separately budgeted plan. By appropriately funding a structured
system, Maine would come closer to ensuring consistently effective
representation.
In a report from a commission studying the future of Maine's
courts, Chief Justice Wathen said, "The status quo is no longer a
viable alternative."37 While this was not said in specific reference
to the court appointment system, the statement was used as a blan-
ket introduction to the report and it does apply. The Commission to
Study the Future of Maine's Courts stated:
The indigent criminal defense system has significant deficien-
cies which require immediate attention. Adequate funding for
the current court-appointment system should be the first and
highest priority. The Judicial and Legislative Branches must
join together to establish a planning process designed to rem-
edy those defects. This process should consider local varia-
tions in the utilization of public defender, contracted services
and the court-appointment system.371
This Author is not optimistic that Maine's system will change any
time soon. Maine is not a wealthy state;3 it is looking for many
369. See, eg., ABA STANDARDS, supra note 307, Standard 5-2.2.
370. NEw DIMENSIONS FOR JUSnCE, supra note 365, at 23.
371. kd at 34-35.
372. According to the World Almanac, the 1994 per capita income for Maine's
1.2 million people was $19,663, while New Hampshire's 1.1 million people had a




ways to cut government spending. Also, we have seen an increasing
desire to cut legal services and get tough on crime.3 73 While the
state may decide not to establish a public defender's office, the state
cannot avoid the proper provision of indigent defense services in the
interest of saving money. To do so violates the principles on which
the criminal justice system was founded. Maine's system must be
changed; how it will be changed is a matter known only to time.
Ronald W. Schneider, Jr.
373. See Coyle, supra note 271; Noaker, supra note 263.
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